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COMPARING THE OLD AND THE NEW POLLUTION 
EXCLUSION CLAUSES IN GENERAL LIABILITY 
INSURANCE POLICIES: NEW LANGUAGE-SAME 
RESULTS? 
Jonathan C. Averback* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The availability of business insurance proceeds benefits both par-
ties seeking compensation for injuries and parties desiring protection 
from such claims. Insurance provides plaintiffs with a source for 
damage awards while also providing defendant businesses with a 
way to survive large, fortuitous losses. 1 Similarly, in environmen-
tally-related lawsuits, insurance can be a potential resource both to 
compensate victims of pollution and to finance clean up of pollutants. 2 
Obtaining pollution insurance may be difficult, however, since insur-
ance companies as well as businesses seeking insurance find unat-
* Citations Editor, 1986-87, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 
1 This Comment analyzes liability insurance policies, un'der which insurers indemnify busi-
nesses from liability to third parties. When this Comment discusses insurance in general, it 
does not refer to first-party insurance policies, which indemnify policyholders for their physical 
injuries or damage to their own property. For a comparison of how policies operate, see 
generally Note, Insurance and Its Role in the Struggle Between Protecting Pollution Victims 
and the Producers of Pollution, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 916-22 (1982). 
2 Several of the cases analyzed in this Comment relate to claims against insurers by defen-
dants in suits under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901-699li (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), §§ 9601-9657 (1982) as 
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. 
No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613. See, e.g., Great Lakes 
Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (underlying 
CERCLA decision: United States v. Ottatti & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D. N.H. 1985»; 
Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 
1227 (1984) (underlying CERCLA case: United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 
(S.D. Ohio 1983». 
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tractive those policies specifically designed to insure pollution. 3 This 
Comment reviews standardized general business insurance policies, 
which are not designed specifically to insure pollution, as sources of 
insurance proceeds for companies faced with contamination-related 
damage claims. 
Insurance companies often use standardized, industry-wide 
contracts4 to insure businesses for certain types of damages. One 
such standardized insurance contract was the Comprehensive Gen-
eral Liability Policy of 1973 ("Comprehensive policy").5 While this 
policy provided coverage for most injuries to third parties, the policy 
attempted to limit insurability of pollution-related injuries. 6 The 
method by which insurers sought to limit their liability was through 
a standardized clause that became known as the "pollution exclusion 
clause."7 The language of this clause appeared to eliminate the in-
surability of all pollution injuries except those that were, in the 
words of the policy, "sudden and accidental."8 
Courts, however, will sometimes expand the definition of what is 
insured under standardized contracts beyond the intent of the in-
dustry. 9 By finding the terms of the pollution exclusion clause am-
3 See Sparrow, Hazardous Waste Insurance Coverage: Unexpected Past, Uncertain Future, 
64 MICH. B.J. 169, 171-73 (1985). Policies specifically designed to insure pollution are called 
"Environmental Impairment Liability" ("ElL") policies or "Pollution Liability Insurance" 
("PLI") policies. This Comment does not address how these policies are interpreted for a 
number of reasons. First, at the present time, there is no reported case law interpreting such 
contracts. Second, EIL/PLI policies generally have had little success on the market. Id.; see 
also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Standards Applicable to Owners and Operators of 
Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities: Liability Coverage, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 33,902, 33,904 (1985) [hereinafter Liability Coverage Standards] (notes decrease in the 
number of insurers offering EILJPLI policies and the high cost of such policies); Last, Tort 
and Insurance Issues, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,252, 10,254 (1985) (identifies 
withdrawal of a major insurance group from the market for EILIPLI policies as the "final 
blow" to such policies). Third, the general business liability policies that are the focus of this 
Comment most likely will be more frequently litigated in the future than EIL/PLI policies. 
See Last, supra, at 10,254; Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation: VIII. Bank-
ruptcy and Insurance Issues, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1578 (1986) [hereinafter Developments 
in the Law]. 
4 See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the reasons insurers adopt 
standardized contract forms. 
5 See M. RHODES, 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D (rev. ed.) § 1.72 (1984) [hereinafter COUCH] 
for the entire Comprehensive policy. See infra notes 24-67 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the development of this policy. 
6 See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. 
7 The Comprehensive policy designates the clause as "exclusion (f)" in the section of the 
policy containing "exclusions." See 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 1.72. 
8 See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text; see also ABA Committee on Business 
Liability Insurance, Liability Insurance Against Environmental Damage: A Status Report-
June 1982, 38 Bus. LAW. 217, 221 (1982) [hereinafter Status Report]. 
9 See Sparrow, supra note 3, at 170; Tyler & Wilcox, Pollution Exclusion Clauses: Problems 
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biguous, courts permitted businesses to recover for a broad range 
of contamination-related injuries under the Comprehensive policy.lO 
Insurers became a financial resource for damage payments even 
though the industry and its supporters claimed that these court 
decisions hampered efforts to limit pollution. 11 
The failure of the pollution exclusion clause in the Comprehensive 
policy to limit the insurability of pollution has led to a redrafting of 
the pollution exclusion clause in a new general business liability 
policy, the Commercial General Liability Policy of 1985 ("Commercial 
policy").12 The new pollution exclusion clause omits the ambiguous 
phrase "sudden and accidental," but nevertheless it may be open to 
similar judicial limitation like the old pollution exclusion clause when 
it is eventually tested. 13 
This Comment focuses on how and why courts interpret general 
business insurance policies as requiring insurers to pay on behalf of 
insureds the cost of contamination-related injuries. It analyzes case 
law interpreting both the Comprehensive policy and its original 
pollution exclusion clause to gain insights into how courts may limit 
recoveries for contamination-related injuries under the Commercial 
policy and its new pollution exclusion clause. First, the Comment 
highlights the development of general liability insurance and provi-
sions relating to pollution injuries. 14 Those terms, industry practices, 
and canons of construction that define insurable contamination under 
the Comprehensive policy will receive special attention. 15 The Com-
ment will review how courts have interpreted the Comprehensive 
policy's pollution exclusion clause, first by looking at the issues on 
in Interpretation and Application Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 17 
IDAHO L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1981); see also Obremski, "Toxic Tort" Litigation and the 
Insurance Coverage Controversy, 34 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 3, 13-22 (1983) (discussing meth-
ods that courts use to hold insurers liable for asbestos-caused injuries). 
10 This Comment uses the phrase "contamination-related injury" to describe any bodily 
injury or property damage arguably connected to an activity described by the pollution 
exclusion clause, regardless of whether the activity was sudden and accidental. See infra 
notes 105-65 and accompanying text for a description of the methods used by courts to 
determine that insurers were liable for many contamination-related injuries under the Com-
prehensive policies. 
11 See Adler & Broiles, The Pollution Exclusion: Implementing the Social Policy of Pre-
venting Pollution Through the Insurance Policy, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1251, 1251-52 (1986); 
Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 520; Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the 
Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1240 (1986). 
12 See infra notes 266-80 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 281-329 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 24-67 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 68-101 and accompanying text. 
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which there is a judicial consensus16 and then by looking at questions 
on which courts varyY One point of this review is to note that courts 
make decisions in this area based not only on the "sudden and 
accidental" phrase but also on another phrase in the pollution exclu-
sion clause that describes what constitutes pollution. 18 A second 
conclusion drawn in this section will be that some of the decisions 
that interpret the pollution exclusion clause overemphasize the "sud-
den and accidental" language and do not read this language in its 
context within the Comprehensive policy.19 This review of case law 
under the Comprehensive policy will indicate potential issues involv-
ing the new Commercial policy and its pollution exclusion clause.2o 
After reviewing the new Commercial policy language,21 the analysis 
will conclude that the problems in the definition of pollution in the 
Comprehensive policy which rendered its pollution exclusion clause 
ineffective are still present in the new Commercial policy.22 The 
Comment will then reevaluate the criticism of some writers that the 
holdings in this area minimize economic incentives to limit pollution. 
The analysis will conclude that in a number of situations, treating 
contamination injuries as insurable helps promote a cleaner environ-
ment. 23 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE 
A. History and Use of General Liability Policies 
Insurance companies adopt standardized insurance contracts be-
cause such contracts are simpler to interpret and more efficient 
operationally than individualized contracts for each insurer and each 
insured. 24 The Comprehensive General Liability Policy of 1973 and 
the Commercial General Liability Policy of 1985 are two examples 
of standardized insurance policies. 25 Uniform language in standard-
16 See infra notes 105-65 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 179-258 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 105-44 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 248-58 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 281-329 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 266-80 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 281-329 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 330-57 and accompanying text. 
24 See R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 2.10(a) (1971); Obremski, supra note 9, at 9. 
25 For the text of the Comprehensive policy, see 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 1. 72. For the 
text of the Commercial policy, see Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability 
Program Edition 11-85: Explanatory Memorandum [hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum]. 
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ized contracts makes estimating insured risks easier for the industry 
because once one court construes such a contract, each insurer can 
apply that decisional law in evaluating the potential for loss under 
its contracts of the type involved in the case. 26 
The problem with standardized contracts is that, to make them 
apply to many different businesses, drafters must write them in 
general language. Unfortunately for insurers, the meaning of gen-
erally-worded standardized policies may appear ambiguous when 
courts apply such policies to particular events.27 As a result, courts 
often interpret the generalized language differently than the insurer 
might have intended. 28 The Comprehensive policy's ambiguity has 
led to a series of decisions expanding the types of risks for which 
the insurer must pay. 29 
The drafters of the Comprehensive policy revised it several times 
to reflect the needs of the insurance industry.30 The organization that 
drafted the two policies serving as the major focus of this Comment 
is the Insurance Services Office (I. S. 0.).31 I. S. O. is a private asso-
ciation of insurance companies that assists its members in drafting 
policies and in estimating risks involved in insuring particular 
clients.32 
I.S.0. and predecessor organizations33 have drafted three versions 
of standardized general business insurance policies relevant to this 
Comment. These policies are the Comprehensive General Liability 
26 Cf. Ward, Policy Simplification, 1959 INS. L.J. 535, 542 (simplified standardized policy 
language encourages uniform rulings in different states); Note, The Calculus of Insurer 
Liability in Asbestos-Related Disease Litigation: Manifestation + Injurious Exposure = 
Continuous Trigger, 23 B.C.L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1982) ("The [Comprehensive policy] ... 
facilitates risk distribution by standardizing the type of risk insured"). 
27 See Obremski, supra note 9, at 9. 
28 For a discussion of how courts construe ambiguities in the Comprehensive policy against 
insurers in toxic tort and asbestos litigation, see generally id. at 11-32. 
29 See, e.g., C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 482 
(3d Cir. 1981); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Ala. 
1985); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 714-15, 664 
P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983). 
30 See Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 
552-53 (1980); Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, Patterns of Judicial Interpretation of Insurance 
Coverage for Hazardous Waste Site Liability, 11 CHEM. WASTE LITIGATION REP. 324, 330 
(1986). 
31 Hurwitz & Kohane, The Love Canal-Insurance Coverage for' Environmental Accidents, 
50 INS. COUNS. J. 378, 378 (1983); Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 499 n.21; Explanatory 
Memorandum, supra note 25, at 1-3. 
32 Telephone interview with Domenick J. Yezzi, Jr., Assistant Manager, Industry Relations 
at 1.S.0. (Dec. 31, 1985). 
33 The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau. 
Hourihan, supra note 30, at 553. 
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Policy of 1966, the Comprehensive General Liability Policy of 1973, 
and the Commercial General Liability Policy of 1985.34 
The overall structure of each policy is similar. All three policies 
define their "coverage"35 by first stating a broad description of cov-
ered injuries and then limiting coverage by setting out events not 
covered. 36 The broad description of coverage is the "basic insurance 
agreement" or basic coverage and the limitations on coverage are 
"exclusion clauses." 
Under both Comprehensive policies, basic coverage is for injuries 
caused by an "occurrence."37 The Commercial policy has two var-
iants. One variant defines coverage by the term "occurrence," while 
the other variation uses a more restrictive trigger for an insurer's 
liability.38 The Comprehensive policies define occurrence as "'an ac-
cident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, 
which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property 
damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured. "'39 This definition of occurrence is so broad that almost any 
injury caused while a policy is in effect is presumed covered provided 
that it is "neither expected nor intended. "40 
34 While each policy successively replaced its predecessor, insurers may still be liable for 
claims made today under the 1966 and the 1973 policies. See Kahn, Looking for "Bodily 
Injury": What Triggers Coverage Under a Standard Comprehensive General Liability Insur-
ance Policy?, 19 FORUM 532, 539 (1984). Under the Comprehensive policies, insurers some-
times must compensate victims for injuries that manifest themselves years after a policy 
expires when such injuries can be linked to an insurable event during the policy period. 
Kunzman, The Insurer as Surrogate Regulator of the Hazardous Waste Industry: Solution 
or Perversion?, 20 FORUM 469, 475 (1985). This type of claim is known as "long-tail" liability. 
Id. See generally Kahn, supra, at 538-53. Long-tail liability can make quite difficult the 
insurer's task of estimating what to charge an insured for a policy. 
35 The "coverage" of an insurance contract is the type of liability for which an insurer agrees 
to pay on behalf of the insured. See 9 COUCH, supra note 5, § 39.3. 
36 See 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 1. 72; Commercial General Liability Coverage Form 1~ 
[hereinafter Commercial Coverage Form], included in Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 
25. 
37 Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 498. 
38 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 25, at 1. In addition to a form of the Commercial 
policy that provides coverage for an "occurrence," a second version provides coverage on a 
"claims made" basis. Under "claims made" policies, coverage does not depend on when the 
damage occurs. Instead, "claims made" coverage requires the insured party to file its claim 
with the insurer within a specified period of time for the claim to be covered. See id.; Sparrow, 
supra note 3, at 169. "Occurrence" based policies allow filing a claim without any time limit. 
See supra note 34. 
39 Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in Environmental Litigation, 11 FORUM 762, 764 
(1976). 
40 See Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 498-99. The issue of whether an occurrence happens 
upon exposure to a condition, manifestation of an injury, or continuously while being exposed 
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In all three policies, "exclusion clauses" limit the broad coverage 
provided by the term "occurrence. "41 Exclusion clauses designate 
certain events that the policy does not cover.42 The reasons under-
lying exclusions vary. Some events, such as automobile damage, may 
be covered already by alternate forms of insurance besides general 
business policies. 43 Other events may be denied coverage because 
the probability that the event will occur is high and the event is 
therefore too costly to insure. The latter type of event is excluded 
from coverage because it is more properly treated as the regular 
cost of doing business than as an insurable 10ss.44 
The 1966 Comprehensive policy exposed insurers to unexpected 
liability for contamination injuries because it contained no clause 
excluding coverage for pollution damage. 45 Insurers may have be-
lieved pollution injuries were not within the definition of "occur-
rence" and that an exclusion clause was unnecessary.46 While insur-
ers had some experience with policies using the term "occurrence" 
prior to 1966, most business coverage had been based on the term 
"accident" rather than the term "occurrence. "47 "Occurrence" is ap-
plicable to a broader range of events than the term "accident. "48 
"Accident" connotes a distinct and unexpected event,49 while "occur-
rence" suggests a less distinct event or stream of events that causes 
unexpected injury. 50 Insurers may have believed that occurrence-
based policies would not cover oil spills from tankers and offshore 
platforms, or emissions from industrial processes. However, the 
Torrey Canyon oil spill,51 the leaks at Santa Barbara,52 and court 
decisions such as Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance 
is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Obremski, 
supra note 9, at 11--32. 
41 See R. KEETON, supra note 24, § 5.1(b)(1). 
42 [d. 
43 Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, supra note 30, at 329. 
44 R. KEETON, supra note 24, § 5.3(a). 
45 See Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 765-66; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 499-500. 
46 See Status Report, supra note 8, at 221; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 499-500. 
47 Hourihan, supra note 30, at 552. 
48 [d. 
49 Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 499; see Note, supra note 11, at 1241-42. 
50 See Kahn, supra note 34, at 534--35; see also Hourihan, supra note 30, at 553 (" ... 
suddenness was no longer a condition to coverage. Foreseeability and intent became the new 
focus for determination of coverage ... "). 
51 The Torrey Canyon was an oil tanker that ran aground off the coast of England in 1967. 
Claims from this oil spill amounted to $7.8 mil;ion. Sparrow, supra note 3, at 171. 
52 In 1969, substantial losses for insurers arose from oil leaks from a drilling platform near 
Santa Barbara, California. Kunzman, supra note 34, at 475. 
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CO.53 expanded the scope of coverage to include these events. These 
incidents made apparent the fact that pollution is covered under the 
1966 Comprehensive policy provided the insured did not intend the 
damage. 54 
The insurers tried to limit the broad liability imposed under the 
1966 Comprehensive policy by drafting a "mandatory pollution en-
dorsement" in 1970. 55 A mandatory endorsement is a separate agree-
ment supplementing the policy's coverage terms.56 In 1973, the man-
datory pollution endorsement was written into the Comprehensive 
policy as the "pollution exclusion clause."57 
B. The 1973 Pollution Exclusion Clause 
The text of the 1973 pollution exclusion clause stated there was 
no coverage for: 
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, 
alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other 
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the at-
mosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclu-
sion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape 
is sudden and accidental. 58 
The pollution exclusion clause contains two phrases that together 
limit coverage for certain pollution-related damage. The first phrase 
identifies contaminating activities for which there is to be no insur-
ance coverage. 59 This phrase provides that there will be no coverage 
for "bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, 
53 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 289 N.E.2d 360 (1972). Grand River emitted pollutants over a seven 
year period. Even though those emissions were part of an ongoing industrial process, the 
court found Grand River covered for pollution-related injuries. The court held that if the 
polluter had no intent to injure a party through its emissions, the damage caused by its 
pollution was an occurrence. See id. at 184-86, 289 N.E.2d at 365-66. 
54 See Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 500 & n.23; Note, supra note 1, at 915; see also 
Note, supra note 11, at 1251 (insurers' primary concern about the 1966 policy "was that the 
occurrence-based policies ... seemed tailor-made to extend coverage to most pollution situ-
ations"). 
55 Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 500 & n.24. 
56 See 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 4.32. 
57 Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 768. 
58 See, e.g., Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30,33 
(1st Cir. 1984); see also 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 1. 72. 
59 See, e.g., C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 479,483 
(3d Cir. 1981); Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co., 347 So. 2d 
95, 99 (Ala. 1977); A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 895-
96,632 P.2d 1377, 1379-80 (1981), a/I'd, 293 Or. 17,643 P.2d 1260 (1982). 
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dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, 
alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other 
irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmo-
sphere or any water course or body of water; . . . "60 The quoted 
phrase denies coverage for certain types of discharges or other 
emissions that cause injury by contamination. 61 For purposes of this 
Comment these contaminating activities will be said to be the subject 
matter of the pollution exclusion clause. 
The ability of the subject matter phrase to limit coverage under 
the Comprehensive policy is itself limited by the second phrase of 
the pollution exclusion clause. 62 The second phrase says that the 
pollution exclusion clause "does not apply if such discharge, disper-
sal, release or escape is sudden and accidental. "63 For purposes of 
this Comment this phrase will be referred to as the "sudden and 
accidental" exception. The "sudden and accidental" exception allows 
coverage for certain occurrences that otherwise would be "excluded" 
because they fell within the subject matter of the pollution exclusion 
clause. 64 
The term "occurrence," the subject matter phrase of the pollution 
exclusion clause, and the clause's "sudden and accidental" exception 
together define coverage under the Comprehensive policy for con-
tamination-caused injuries. 65 Recently, in the 1985 Commercial pol-
60 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
61 See Molton, 347 So. 2d at 99; Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 
401, 403-04, 456 N. Y.S.2d 504, 505-06 (App. Div. 1982); City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting 
Co., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 384-85, 344 N.W.2d 523, 526-27 (Ct. App. 1983). Two cases that are 
also based on interpreting what is a contamination injury are Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home 
Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977), and Clement v. Taylor, 382 So. 2d 
231 (La. App. 1980). These cases involved a variant of the pollution exclusion clause, the oil 
pollution endorsement, which omitted any "exception" language that allowed coverage for 
"sudden and accidental" contamination. 
62 See 12 COUCH, supra note 5, § 44A:5. 
63 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
64 See Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 
132, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1233 (1984). 
65 Other exclusion clauses may be relevant in some cases. For example, some cases consid-
ering the pollution exclusion clause also discuss such exclusion clauses as the "completed 
operations hazard exclusion," the "intentional acts exclusion," and the "violation of law exclu-
sion." See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 227-29 (Me. 1980); CPS 
Chern. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 567-68, 489 A.2d 1265, 1269-70 (L. 
Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (App. Div. 1985). This 
Comment will not discuss the applicability of these exclusion clauses, except insofar as to note 
that none of these were determinative in any of the cases discussed. 
The question of what constitutes "damages" is also relevant in determining coverage for 
governmental claims for reimbursement of cleanup or "response" costs under CERCLA. See 
42 U. S. C. § 9607 (1982). All courts deciding underlying governmental claims under this section 
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icy, I.S.O. has rewritten the pollution exclusion clause. 66 This Com-
ment will discuss the language and effectiveness of the new contract 
form after reviewing the case law under the 1973 Comprehensive 
policy,67 for such a review may point out interpretational issues 
courts will face under the new wording. The case law under the 
Comprehensive policy is in turn influenced by principles of insurance 
law, specifically the duties of insurers under insurance contracts and 
the interpretational doctrines that courts use to determine a con-
tract's coverage. 
III. THE DUTIES OF INSURERS AND INSURANCE CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES 
The two basic duties of an insurer are the duty to indemnify and 
the duty to defend. The duty to indemnify is essentially the respon-
sibility of the insurer to pay on behalf of the insured those obligations 
agreed upon by the two parties in the insurance contract. 68 In both 
the Comprehensive and the Commercial policies, this duty applies 
generally for bodily injury or property damage to third parties 
caused by an occurrence.69 The duty to indemnify arises only upon 
a determination that the injuries are actually caused by a covered 
risk. 70 
have denied jury trials, generally holding that such claims are equitable claims for restitution. 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 430, 432 (D. Md. 1986). Insurers argue 
that such equitable claims are not within the coverage of Comprehensive policies because the 
claims are not for legal damages or property damage. Two courts have accepted the insurers' 
arguments. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(alternate holding of two judges); Armco, 643 F. Supp. at 435. At least one federal circuit 
court has rejected this argument directly in the context of CERCLA. See Continental Ins. 
Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1987) (2-1 
majority). Other courts allow coverage for the cost of complying with governmental cleanup 
orders under other statutes. See United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. 
App. 579, 589-90, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 282-83, 350 A.2d 520, 524 (Ch. Div. 1975), afl'd, 145 N.J. Super. 
433,368 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977). These courts 
view the underlying claims to be damages to the state in its quasi-sovereign capacity as 
guardian of the environment. See, e.g., Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 811 F.2d at 1185-89. 
66 See infra notes 259-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commercial policy. 
67 See infra notes 102-258 and accompanying text. 
68 For a discussion of the principle of indemnity in insurance contracts, see generally R. 
KEETON, supra note 24, § 3.1. 
69 Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 498-99; Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 25, at 
1. A second version of the Commercial policy restricts coverage to claims made during a policy 
period. I d. The effect of this is to eliminate the "long-tail" liability of occurrence based policies. 
See supra note 34. 
70 9 COUCH, supra note 5, § 39.3. 
1987] POLLUTION EXCLUSION 611 
The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.71 While 
the duty to indemnify is limited to actually covered events, the duty 
to defend requires that the insurer defend the insured against any 
complaint that alleges a potentially covered injury.72 The insurer 
must defend the insured against even specious complaints that allege 
a covered injury, regardless of the probability that the insurer will 
actually have to pay anyone. 73 One reason the duty to defend is 
broader than the duty to indemnify is to avoid forcing the policy-
holder to litigate an independent trial of the underlying case in order 
to find the insurance company liable. 74 
Closely related to the duty to defend is the obligation to settle 
when given a reasonable offer. 75 One result of the obligation to settle 
is that the duty to defend often becomes the major focus of litigation. 
The question of the duty to indemnify may never be resolved by a 
court because settlement often disposes of insurance cases. 76 The 
obligation to settle that arises out of the duty to defend any poten-
tially covered claim makes insurers vulnerable to several contract 
interpretation rules that allow many claims to appear potentially 
covered. 77 
To determine whether an insurer must defend or indemnify an 
insured, courts rely on general rules of contract interpretation and 
71 E.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 97, 467 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1984); 
Shapiro v. Public Servo Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 653, 477 N.E.2d 146, 151, 
review denied, 395 Mass. 1102, 480 N.E.2d 24 (1985); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 
80 A.D.2d 415,420,439 N.Y.S.2d 538, 541 (App. Div.), mot. for lv. to app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 
608, 427 N.E.2d 1191, 443 N. Y.S.2d 1030 (1981). 
72 See 14 COUCH, supra note 5, § 51.42. 
73 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 226 (Me. 1980) (insured has right to 
defense "even when the allegations are broad, and uncertain as to specific facts," provided 
that the allegations state potential liability within the policy's coverage); Jackson Township 
Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 160, 451 A.2d 
990,992 (L. Div. (1982) (duty to defend "is not excused because the claim cannot be maintained 
against the insured either in law or in fact"); see also, Shapiro, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 653, 477 
N.E.2d at 150-51 (policy in question provided that the insurer had a duty to defend any suit 
for '''property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or 
fraudulent ... m). 
74 See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. 
75 14 COUCH, supra note 5, § 51.1. 
76 See Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 771. Several courts have required insurers to defend 
purchasers of Comprehensive policies without determining whether the pollution exclusion 
clause would bar eventual indemnification of the insured's losses. See, e.g., C.H. Heist Caribe 
Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1981); Idaho v. Bunker 
Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064, 1073, 1076 (D. Idaho 1986); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. 
App. 3d 94, 98, 467 N.E.2d 287,290 (1984). 
77 See Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, supra note 30, at 332 (" ... much of insurance case law 
favorable to insureds has arisen in the context of the insurer's duty to defend."). 
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construction, as well as doctrines specially applicable to insurance 
policies. One such principle is that when the provisions of an insur-
ance contract are clear, courts interpret the contract as it is writ-
ten. 78 To clarify a policy's meaning, insurers often print specially 
defined terms in a different typeface or surround them in quotations, 
and spell out these terms in the policy's definitional section. 79 Courts 
attempt to honor all the terms of an insurance contract. 80 
Where a contract's terms are ambiguous, courts favor a reasonable 
construction that supports coverage. 81 When a court construes am-
biguities in favor of coverage it prevents frustration of the basic 
purpose for purchasing insurance: the indemnification of losses. 82 
Provisions in a contract are ambiguous if particular words are rea-
sonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. 83 Courts require 
those phrases that create exceptions to the basic coverage provi-
sions-"exclusions"-to clearly exclude coverage84 in order to pre-
vent the elimination of more coverage than intended by the insured. 85 
Courts will not honor the insurer's intention to limit coverage of 
certain risks if this intention is ambiguously expressed. 86 Instead, 
courts look for both parties' objectively-manifested intent, as implied 
by the words of the contract. 87 One principle of contract interpre-
tation that courts will use to imply the parties' intent is that of 
ejusdem generis. 88 This principle allows a court to infer that specific 
words restrict the meaning of general terms when the specific terms 
precede the general terms in a particular phrase. 89 Thus, in a phrase 
"cattle, hogs and other animals," "animals" may not refer to much 
more than farm animals, because the specific animals mentioned 
before the general word are hogs and cattle. 90 Ejusdem generis is 
only one aspect of a broader doctrine holding that general phrases 
78 See 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.10. 
79 See, e.g., 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 1.72; Commercial Coverage Form, supra note 36. 
80 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.29. 
81 [d. § 15.74. 
82 [d. § 15.26; Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, supra note 30, at 329. 
83 C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 481 (3d Cir. 
1981); cf. Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. 
Super. 156, 161, 451 A.2d 990, 992 (L. Div. 1982) (if the policy's terms permit two interpre-
tations, a court will apply the one that favors the insured). 
84 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.71. 
85 See 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 5.2. 
86 See 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.26. 
87 [d. § 15.9. 
88 [d. § 15.69. 
89 [d. § 15.71; E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.11 (1982). 
90 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 89, § 7.11. 
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may be restricted in meaning by being grouped with specific terms 
regardless of the ordering. 91 Thus, as in the above example, the term 
"animals" in the phrase "animals, cattle and hogs" may be limited to 
farm animals under this broader doctrine. In applying construction 
doctrines, courts look to the ordinary meanings of the words used 
in a phrase to discern the intent of the parties. 92 
Closely related to a court's attempt to find the objective intent of 
the parties is the court's attempt to discern the reasonable expec-
tations of the insured as to coverage. 93 Since the insurer drafts and 
controls the wording of the insurance policy,94 the expectations of a 
reasonably prudent person buying the insurance is given more 
weight than the expectations of the insurer. 95 The known character 
of the insured's business affects the assumed expectations of both 
parties to the contract. 96 When a risk is one that a prudent person 
in the position of the insured would reasonably expect to be covered, 
an exclusion clause must clearly bar coverage to be effective. 97 
Insurers have the burden of establishing that an exclusion clause 
clearly denies coverage. 98 This burden is more difficult to overcome 
when there is a split in prior judicial interpretations of the same 
wording. 99 Also, the burden may be increased or decreased by a 
consensus in judicial interpretation of the same language favoring 
either insurers or insureds. 100 A consensus may be a prudential limit 
on a court's opportunity to reinterpret a standardized contract, be-
cause the parties to the contract are presumed to have understood 
the contract's terms in accordance with the judicial consensus posi-
tion at the time of making the contract. 101 
91 See 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.7l. 
92 2 COUCH, supra note 5, §§ 15.17-.18. 
93 See, e.g., A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 893-94, 632 
P.2d 1377, 1378-79 (1981), a/I'd, 293 Or. 17, 643 P.2d 1260 (1982); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. 
Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 714-15, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 
100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983). 
94 R. KEETON, supra note 24, § 6.3(a). 
95 See 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.84. 
96 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.26; see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 
489,426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (App. Div. 1980); A-l Sandblasting, 53 Or. App. at 896,632 P.2d 
at 1380. 
97 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.93. To make what is and what is not covered apparent to 
the insured, in policies such as the Comprehensive and the Commercial policies, insurance 
companies place exclusion clauses in the section describing coverage immediately following 
the basic insurance agreement. R. KEETON, supra note 24, § 2.1l(d). 
98 12 COUCH, supra note 5, § 44A.3. 
99 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.84. 
100 [d. § 15.20. 
101 [d. 
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Insurers have generally failed to carry the burden of showing that 
the 1973 Comprehensive policy's pollution exclusion clause clearly 
denies coverage for many types of pollution. Through analyzing the 
pollution exclusion clause in light of the duties of insurers and various 
construction rules, a consensus has emerged favoring insureds under 
the Comprehensive policy that has made the clause ineffective as a 
bar to insurer liability. 
IV. JUDICIAL CONSENSUS INTERPRETATION OF COVERAGE 
UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE POLICY 
Fact patterns of cases involving the 1973 Comprehensive policy's 
pollution exclusion clause and analytical approaches applied by courts 
reviewing this clause are so similar that there is an effective con-
sensus view among courts that the policy permits coverage for many 
pollution claims. 102 In the typical scenario presented by cases turning 
on the applicability of the pollution exclusion clause, an injured party 
files a complaint against the insured to recover for damage resulting 
from contamination. 103 The insured then files a claim with the insurer 
for defense and indemnification.104 In these cases, the insurer refuses 
to defend or indemnify the insured because, in the insurer's view, 
the pollution exclusion clause barred coverage for the alleged injury. 
Either the insurer or the insured will then file a separate action on 
the issue of whether the insurer had a duty to defend or indemnify. 
The case is then analyzed by a court applying reasoning that falls 
into common patterns. 
This section will consider the analytical approach used by courts 
in thirteen states to find coverage for contamination-related injuries 
under Comprehensive policies that contain the pollution exclusion 
clause. 105 The analysis will focus on two series of decisions that found 
102 Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, supra note 30, at 328; see infra notes 111-73 and accom-
panying text. 
103 See, e.g., Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 31 
(1st Cir. 1984); C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurrance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 
480 (3d Cir. 1981); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 95, 467 N.E.2d 287, 288 
(1984). 
104 For a description of claims processing, see generally R. KEETON, supra note 24, § 7. 
105 Examples include: Alabama: Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977); California: Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 
App. 3d 1012, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977); Florida: Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guar. 
Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Illinois: Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 98, 467 N.E.2d 
at 290; Louisiana: Clement v. Taylor, 382 So. 2d 231 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Maine: Travelers 
Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220 (Me. 1980); Massachusetts: Shapiro v. Public Servo Mut. 
Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648,477 N.E.2d 146, review denied, 395 Mass. 1102,480 N.E.2d 
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coverage for the insured. The first series found coverage because 
the pollution exclusion clause's initial phrase, which defines pollution 
injuries for the purposes of the clause,106 did not describe the par-
ticular contamination injury for which the insured sought cover-
age. l07 In the second series of opinions, courts interpreted the pol-
lution exclusion clause's exception that permits coverage for sudden 
and accidental pollution108 to mean that the pollution injury merely 
needed to be unexpected and unintended to be covered. l09 
A. Subject Matter Limitations 
One method for finding coverage for injuries caused by contami-
nation is to limit the subject matter of the pollution exclusion 
clause. 11o By examining the manner and type of emissions listed in 
the initial phrase of the clause, which describes the scope of poten-
tially uninsurable pollution,111 courts imply that the clause applies 
only to injuries directly caused by industrial contamination of the 
environment-at-large. 112 Courts find that the pollution exclusion 
clause does not limit coverage when the contamination to be covered 
is non-industrial,113 when there is no allegation of environmental 
pollution,114 and when coverage is reasonably expected by the in-
sured. 115 Rather than stating that the particular pollution incident. 
at issue is "sudden and accidental," courts limit an insurer's ability 
to avoid liability by holding that in these instances the type of injury 
is not one described by the clause's general language prohibiting 
24 (1985); New Jersey: Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (L. Div. 1982); New York: Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. 
Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504 (App. Div. 1982); Ohio: Buckeye 
Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 
(1984); Oregon: A-I Sandblasting & Steamcieaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 632 P.2d 
1377 (1981), afi'd, 293 Or. 17,643 P.2d 1260 (1982); Washington: United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's 
Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 664 P.2d 1262, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 
(1983); see also C.H. Heist, 640 F.2d at 483 (applying Virgin Island law). 
106 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
107 See infra notes 111-35 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra notes 145-73 and accompanying text. 
110 See infra notes 113-35 and accompanying text. 
III See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
112 An example of industrial contamination of the environment-at-large would be the stereo-
typical manufacturer who discharges wastes into a river. 
113 For examples, see infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. 
114 For examples, see infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. 
115 For examples, see infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
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coverage for pollution-caused injuries. 116 The three categories of 
limitations on the pollution exclusion clause's scope will be discussed 
in turn. 
1. N on-Industrial Contamination Injuries 
The first group of decisions holds that contamination injuries 
caused by non-industrial activities are outside the scope of the sub-
ject matter of the pollution exclusion clause because the pollutants 
and actions identified in the subject matter language all arise from 
industrial operations. 117 Courts have noted that the specific language 
in the subject matter phrase identifying various industrial-type emis-
sions such as "soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals ... " 
precedes the general language in the pollution exclusion clause con-
cerning "other irritants, contaminants or pollutants."118 From this 
arrangement of terms, courts imply an intent to limit the breadth of 
the general language to industrial irritants, contaminants and pol-
lutants. 119 
Courts have found that the pollution exclusion clause does not 
eliminate coverage unless the insured is an industrial polluter. For 
example, the pollution exclusion clause has not barred coverage for 
non-industrial insureds such as a real estate development company 
that had sand run from its development site onto adjacent proper-
ties. 120 Similarly, an insurer had to defend an insured county when 
the injuries the county allegedly caused were due to miscellaneous 
acts of negligence in safeguarding a waste site. The county did not 
actually dump chemicals as part of its operations, and therefore was 
not an industrial polluter. 121 Another court found for an insured 
116 See, e.g., Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401, 404, 456 
N.Y.S.2d 504, 506 (App. Div. 1982); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 
Wash. App. 708, 715, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983). 
117 See Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 
(Ala. 1977); Autotronic, 89 A.D.2d at 403, 456 N. Y.S.2d at 505-06; Niagara County v. Utica 
Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415,439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div.), mot. for Lv. to app. dism., 54 
N.Y.2d 608,427 N.E.2d 1191, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1981). 
118 Molton, 347 So. 2d at 98; A-I Sandblasting & Steamc1eaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 
890, 893-94, 632 P.2d 1377, 1379 (1981), aff'd, 293 Or. 17, 643 P.2d 1260 (1982). For the 
language of the exclusion, see supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
119 Molton, 347 So. 2d at 99. The basis of implying an intent to limit the language to industrial 
contaminants is the doctrine of ejusdem generis, discussed supra notes 88-90 and accompany-
ing text. 
120 Molton, 347 So. 2d at 99-100. The Molton court held that sand running off a developer's 
property onto abutters' land and into a lake did not constitute an irritant within the meaning 
of the exclusion as drafted. Id. 
121 Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div.), 
mot. for Lv. to app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608, 427 N.E.2d 1191, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1981). The 
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builder of a gas station when it distinguished injuries due to the 
negligent construction of the facility from injuries caused by the 
operation of the station. 122 These holdings limited the class of pol-
luters not insured by a Comprehensive policy containing the pollution 
exclusion clause to those manufacturers who cause injury by expel-
ling waste into the air and water or onto land as a result of their 
particular business activities. 123 
2. Non-Pollution Injuries 
The subject matter of the pollution exclusion clause is also limited 
when the insured is not alleged to have injured other parties by 
underlying complaints against the county alleged various acts of negligence in connection with 
safeguarding the Love Canal hazardous waste site. Id. at 420, 439 N. Y.S.2d at 541. No party 
to the litigation "seriously contended that Niagara County actually dumped any contaminants," 
so the county was not an actual industrial polluter. Id. at 418 n.2, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 540 n.2. 
Because the appellate court viewed the pollution exclusion clause as applying to actual polluting 
acts of the insured, id. at 418,439 N.Y.S.2d at 540, the Niagara court held that Utica had a 
clear duty to defend the county in the complaints. Id. at 420, 439 N. Y.S.2d at 541-42. 
The lower court had granted summary judgment for the county on the issue of the duty to 
defend. It found that in the absence of allegations that the county directly was involved in 
the dumping, the pollution may have been "sudden and accidental" from the standpoint of the 
insured. Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814,821,427 N.Y.S.2d 171, 
176 (Sup. Ct. 1980), aff'd, 80 A.D.2d 415,439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div.), mot. for Iv. to app. 
dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608, 427 N.E.2d 1191, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1981). In so holding, the Niagara 
court reasoned: 
To hold that a municipality should be deprived of a defense by an insurance company 
in an action premised on pollution wrongdoing, where the strongest allegations only 
state that the industrial chemical waste dumping took place within the municipality, 
or that the municipality acquiesced to the dumping, or had notice of the dumping, 
would lead to the conclusion that no municipality could expect a defense, if named in 
a suit involving industrial pollution of an area within the municipality. 
Id. at 818, 427 N. Y.S.2d at 174. Two of Niagara County's attorneys, Sheldon Hurwitz and 
Dan D. Kohane, suggest the basis for the appellate decision was that the damage was 
unexpected and unintended from the county's standpoint. Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 31, 
at 383. Various courts and commentators view Niagara as based on limiting the pollution 
exclusion clause to industrial, active, or "actual" polluters. See City of Northglenn v. Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Colo. 1986); Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 163, 451 A.2d 990, 993-94 (Law Div. 
1982); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401, 403, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504, 
505 (App. Div. 1982); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 
714, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983); Hadzi-Antich, Coverage 
for Environmental Liabilities Under the Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy: 
How to Walk a Bull Through a China Shop, 17 CONN. L. REV. 769, 794 (1985); Note, supra 
note 11, at 1268-69. 
122 Autotronic, 89 A.D.2d at 404, 456 N. Y.S.2d at 506 (1982) (builder of a gasoline station 
is not the day-to-day commercial operator to whom the exclusion applies). 
123 See Molton, 347 So. 2d at 99; Autotronic, 89 A.D.2d at 404, 456 N. Y.S.2d at 506; see 
also Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 514. 
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environmental contamination. 124 The language used in the initial 
phrase of the pollution exclusion clause eliminates coverage for in-
juries caused by pollutants emitted "into or upon land, the atmo-
sphere or any watercourse or body of water . . . "125 Implicit in this 
language is that emissions that do not enter the general environ-
ment-the land, water or air at large-are covered. 126 Thus, toxic 
fumes127 and sandblasting dustl28 that do not escape the workplace 
are covered under the Comprehensive policy despite the pollution 
exclusion clause. In these instances, there is contamination of indi-
viduals but no pollution of the environment. 
Additionally, some courts have limited the subject matter of the 
exclusionary clause to contamination injuries. 129 For example, two 
courts held injuries from the explosion of discharged petroleum to 
be covered because these injuries were alleged to be from the blast 
and not from contamination. 130 The consistent basis for the decisions 
in workplace contamination and petroleum explosion cases is that 
courts find the pollution exclusion clause applicable only when a third 
party plaintiff alleges an injury directly resulting from the insured's 
pollution of the land, air or water. 
124 See C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d 
Cir. 1981); Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1019, 134 Cal. Rptr. 
904, 908 (1977); Connor v. Farmer, 382 So. 2d 1069, 1069-70 (La. App.), cert. denied, 385 So. 
2d 267 (La. 1980); Clement v. Taylor, 382 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. App. 1980). 
125 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
126 See C.H. Heist, 640 F.2d at 483. 
127 See C.H. Heist, 640 F.2d at 483. Toxic fumes and substances stored in a tank injured a 
C.H. Heist employee while he was cleaning it. The C.H. Heist court noted that the worker's 
complaint did not allege that there had been a discharge into the air, land or water. The 
pollution exclusion clause was held inapplicable without an allegation of discharge into the 
environment. The court noted that even if a discharge could be implied from the terms of the 
complaint, American had a duty to defend C.H. Heist since some possible discharges would 
be insured under the policy. [d. 
126 Connor, 382 So. 2d at 1069-70 (employer of a worker who developed silicosis over term 
of employment covered when contamination is not alleged to have entered environment). The 
Connor opinion also stood for the proposition that insurers must cover injuries when the 
injuries result from both an excluded and a covered cause. [d. at 1070. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court overruled this aspect of Connor in Picou v. Ferrara, 412 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (La. 1987). 
129 See Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1019, 134 Cal. Rptr. 
904, 908 (1977). Pepper discharged gasoline into the San Diego sewer system, thereby causing 
a fire and an explosion. The city sued Pepper for the explosion, and Pepper in turn sued its 
insurers. The Pepper court found for Pepper against the insurer because the city's complaint 
alleged injury by explosion and not by pollution. [d. Cf. City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting 
Corp., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 386, 344 N. W.2d 523, 527 (Ct. App. 1983). Allied Smelting discharged 
acids into the Milwaukee sewers over a period of years, thereby causing corrosion. The Allied 
Smelting court found no coverage for the company since Allied Smelting caused the corrosion 
through contamination. See id. 
130 Pepper, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 908; Clement v. Taylor, 382 So. 2d 
231, 234 (La. Ct. App. 1980). 
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3. Reasonable Expectations of the Parties 
In addition to holding that the language setting the pollution ex-
clusion clause's scope does not eliminate coverage for non-industrial 
pollution and non-environmental contamination, courts attempt to 
honor the perceived expectations and intent of the parties when 
determining the scope of the policy's coverage. 131 Courts weigh var-
ious factors when they try to discern the reasonable expectations of 
the parties. For example, courts look to the nature of the insured's 
business as one factor that shapes the parties' reasonable expecta-
tions concerning coverage. 132 Thus, parties to a Comprehensive pol-
icy issued to a bridge spraypainting company would reasonably ex-
pect that the policy would cover overspray damage to passersby. 133 
Courts also consider the type of property that the insurer agreed to 
insure. For example, when an insurer agrees to cover injuries caused 
by a gasoline tank, the insurer cannot maintain that the pollution 
exclusion clause bars coverage of damage caused by leaks from the 
tank. 134 Finally, courts favor coverage when it appears that the 
policy's language or the insurer's actions fostered a belief that the 
insured was covered. 135 
Should the insured's activity not be within the subject matter of 
the pollution exclusion clause, either by being non-industrial pollu-
131 See Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415,419-20,439 N.Y.S.2d 538, 
541 (App. Div.), mot. for Iv. to app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608,427 N.E.2d 1191, 443 N.Y.S.2d 
1030 (1981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 489, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 
(App. Div. 1980); A-I Sandblasting & Steam cleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 894, 632 
P.2d 1377, 1379 (1981), aff'd, 293 Or. 17, 643 P.2d 1260 (1982); see also supra notes 93-97 and 
accompanying text. 
132 See A-1 Sandblasting, 53 Or. App. at 896, 632 P.2d at 1380. A-I contended it had applied 
for and had obtained insurance for overs pray damage to passing vehicles that were splattered 
while A-I cleaned and painted a bridge. It maintained that the insurer was familiar with the 
nature of A-l's spraypainting operation and intended to cover it. The insurers argued they 
were not liable as a matter of law under the exclusion. The A-I Sandblasting court held that 
the intent of both parties to the insurance contract was a question of fact and that the pollution 
exclusion could not be interpreted to preclude as a matter of law coverage for overspray 
damage. 
133 See id. at 896, 632 P.2d at 1380. On further appeal of A-1 Sandblasting, the Supreme 
Court of Oregon held that the overspray damage was not so highly foreseeable as to constitute 
an uninsurable cost of doing business. 293 Or. at 26, 643 P.2d at 1265. 
134 See Klock Oil, 73 A.D.2d at 489, 426 N. Y.S.2d at 605. 
135 [d.; see United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 714-15, 
664 P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983) (terms of contract imply objective 
intent of insurer to cover third party claims for lost use of property arising out of gasoline 
leak); see also 1 COUCH supra note 5, § 5.2 ("property which would reasonably be included in 
the [term "occurrence"] is covered, and if the insurers intend otherwise, it should be excluded 
by proper terms"); cf. Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 6, 487 A.2d 820, 
823 (1984) (no coverage when insurer warns insured in advance of occurrence that a specific 
injury may be expected to arise from an industrial process). 
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tion,136 non-environmental contamination,137 or by being reasonably 
expected to be covered,138 then arguably it is not necessary to de-
termine if the contamination would otherwise be excepted from the 
clause. 139 If the pollution exclusion clause's subject matter phrase140 
does not unambiguously declare the contamination activity excluded, 
then under ordinary insurance contract interpretational rules courts 
should construe the ambiguity in favor of the insured. 141 This prin-
ciple of interpretation alone has been sufficient to support the claim 
for coverage under the 1973 Comprehensive policy.142 
Some courts, however, also attempt to interpret the exception to 
the pollution exclusion clause-the "sudden and accidental" excep-
tion-in addition to interpreting the language in the pollution exclu-
sion clause. 143 Even more courts omit discussion of the scope of the 
pollution exclusion clause entirely without any explanation. 144 The 
cases discussing the "sudden and accidental" exception have severely 
limited the pollution exclusion clause by expanding what is consid-
ered "sudden and accidental." 
B. Expanding the "Sudden and Accidental" Exception 
The terms "sudden" and "accidental" are not defined in the Com-
prehensive policy and therefore must be given content by the 
136 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. 
l:l7 See supra note 124--30 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra note 131-35 and accompanying text. 
139 See C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d 
Cir. 1981); Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95, 
99-100 (Ala. 1977); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401, 404, 456 
N. Y.S.2d 504, 506 (App. Div. 1982); A-I Sandblasting & Steamcieaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. 
App. 890, 897 n.2, 632 P.2d 1377, 1381 n.2 (1981), afi'd, 293 Or. 17, 643 P.2d 1260 (1982); 
Van's Westlake, 34 Wash. App. at 715,664 P.2d at 1266; see also Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home 
Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1015-16, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904, 906 (1977); Clement v. Taylor, 
382 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. App. 1980). Pepper and Clement are especially significant since the 
policies at issue contained an oil pollution endorsement that entirely omitted the "sudden and 
accidental" exception. 
140 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra notes 110-35 and accompanying text. 
143 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 488, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604-05 
(App. Div. 1980); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814,821,427 N.Y.S.2d 
171, 176 (Sup. Ct. 1980), afr'd, 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div.), mot. for Lv. to 
app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608,427 N.E.2d 1191, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1981). 
144 See, e.g., Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 
33-34 (1st Cir. 1984); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94,96-98,467 N.E.2d 287, 
289-90 (1984); Shapiro v. Public Servo Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 651-53, 477 
N.E.2d 146, 149-50, review denied, 395 Mass. 1102,480 N.E.2d 24 (1985). 
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courts. 145 Most courts consider the phrase to mean unexpected, un-
intended and unforeseen. Consider the phrase to mean unexpected, 
unintended and unforeseen. 146 Thus, certain situations which may 
not be sudden and accidental at first glance are interpreted as such, 
and are consequently insured. 
Courts interpret the phrase "sudden and accidental" to describe 
pollution damage that results from the intervention of forces outside 
the insured's direct control.147 In Lansco, Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Protection,148 for example, the court held that when 
vandals use an insured's property to cause damage to others, they 
are one such intervening force. 149 Similarly, with regard to a waste 
generating chemical company, a waste hauler may be an intervening 
force should the hauler dump the generator's refuse in a manner 
that the generator neither expected nor intended. 150 The resulting 
145 See Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 
132, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (1984). The Buckeye court found for the insured because the court 
interpreted "sudden" and "accidental" as meaning unexpected and unintended. Id. at 134, 477 
N.E.2d at 1235. 
146 See, e.g., Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 282, 350 
A.2d 520,524 (Ch. Div. 1975), aiI'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1976), cert. 
denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977); Klock Oil, 73 A.D.2d at 488-89,426 N.Y.S.2d at 605. 
147 See Shapiro v. Public Servo Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 477 N.E.2d 146, review 
denied, 395 Mass. 1102, 480 N.E.2d 24 (1985); CPS Chern. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 
N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265 (L. Div. 1984), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 203 N.J. 
Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (App. Div. 1985); Lansco, 138 N.J. Super. at 81, 350 A.2d at 523; 
Liberty Solvents, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 134, 477 N.E.2d at 1235. 
148 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (Ch. Div. 1975), afl'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 
363 (App. Div. 1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977). 
149 Vandals spilled oil from Lansco's tanks into the Hackensack River, and when the state 
asked Lansco to pay for the cleanup, Lansco sued its insurers for coverage. Lansco, 138 N.J. 
Super. at 277-79, 350 A.2d at 521-22. The Lansco court held that "since the oil spill was 
neither expected nor intended by Lansco, it follows that the spill was sudden and accidental 
under the exclusion clause even if caused by the deliberate act of a third party." Id. at 282, 
350 A.2d at 524. 
150 See CPS Chem., 199 N.J. Super. at 568-69,489 A.2d at 1270-71. According to the New 
Jersey lower court's opinion, CPS Chemical, a New Jersey manufacturer, hired a hauler who 
illegally and without CPS's knowledge dumped CPS's waste at a Philadelphia waste site. 
Philadelphia sued CPS Chemical under various common-law liability theories and under CER-
CLA for response costs. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 
(E.D. Pa. 1982). The New Jersey lower court understood that in Philadelphia's suit, CPS 
Chemical was not alleged to have expected or intended the hauling company to illegally dump 
the wastes and damage property. CPS Chem., 199 N.J. Super. at 563,489 A.2d at 1268. The 
state lower court granted summary judgment for CPS Chemical on the issue of duty to defend. 
Id. at 569, 489 A.2d at 1271. 
At the summary judgment hearing before the state lower court, counsel for CPS Chemical 
represented that Philadelphia was dropping all intentional tort theories against generators in 
the federal court suit. CPS Chern. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 203 N.J. Super. 15, 18-19,495 
A.2d 886,887 (App. Div. 1985), rev'g per curiam, 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265 (L. Div. 
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contamination would be sudden151 and accidentaP52 from the gener-
ator's standpoint. Natural corrosion153 is another event that courts 
have held to be an intervening force, even though the damage cor-
rosion causes-for instance, slow leaks from underground tanks-
hardly seems sudden. 154 When an insured takes reasonable steps to 
detect and prevent natural corrosion, but the insured's property 
nevertheless corrodes, the corrosion intervenes to cause discharges 
in an unexpected and unintended manner. Courts have viewed un-
expected and unintended discharges to be sudden and accidental. 155 
Some courts go so far as to say that unintended injuries resulting 
from the insured's intentional acts are also sudden and accidental 
because these injuries are unexpected and unintended from the 
standpoint of the insured. For example, in Reliance Insurance Co. 
v. Martin,156 condominium owners sued the operators of an adjacent 
parking garage for property damage caused by soot and exhaust. 157 
1984). One year after the hearing, the insurer discovered that Philadelphia had not dropped 
the intentional tort theories from its underlying suit. Id. at 19, 495 A.2d at 888. As a result 
of this information, the New Jersey appellate court reversed per curiam the lower court's 
granting of summary judgment. Id. at 20, 495 A.2d at 889. The appellate court held that the 
confusion over the pleadings in the underlying case precluded forcing the insurer to defend 
CPS Chemical. I d. The appellate court specifically refused to express any opinion on the lower 
court's analysis of the pollution exclusion clause. Id. at 21, 495 A.2d at 889. 
151 The lower court viewed "sudden" to mean "unforeseen, unexpected [and] unprepared 
for." CPS Chemical, 199 N.J. Super. at 569, 489 A.2d at 1270. 
152 The court found that to satisfy the "accidental" aspect of the pollution exclusion clause, 
the insured need show only that the party damaged by the pollution alleged that a person 
engaged by the insured performed acts that were not expected nor foreseen by the insured. 
See id. at 564, 489 A.2d at 1268. 
153 Shapiro v. Public Servo Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 650, 477 N.E.2d 146, 149, 
review denied, 395 Mass. 1102,480 N.E.2d 24 (1985). Oil leaked from a corroded underground 
tank at an apartment house into an adjacent waterway. The leak was not foreseeable since 
the insured had had the tank professionally inspected five months before the escape of oil. Id. 
at 652 n.3, 477 N.E.2d at 150 n.3. 
154 Since the insured did not know of the corrosion, the Shapiro court viewed the escape of 
oil to be unexpected, unintended and not designed, and therefore "sudden and accidental" 
within the meaning of the pollution exclusion clause. Id. at 652-53, 477 N.E. at 150. 
155 See Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189, 1192-93 (S.D. Fla. 
1985); Evans v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 107 Misc. 2d 710,713,435 N.Y.S.2d 933,935 
(Sup. Ct. 1981); ~f. Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 
3d 127, 134,477 N.E.2d 1227, 1235 (1984) (both the discharges and the property damage were 
unexpected and unintended, and therefore could be found sudden and accidental); Transa-
merica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 141, 711 P.2d 212, 214 (1985), review denied, 301 
Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986) (intentional discharges not sudden and accidental). 
156 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 467 N.E.2d 287 (1984). 
157Id. at 95, 467 N.E.2d at 288. The suit alleged this damage occurred over a period of 
time. Id. For a discussion of whether damage occurring over a period of time can be sudden 
and accidental, see infra notes 185-222 and accompanying text. 
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The insurer, Reliance, refused to defend the operators. 158 Reliance 
obtained a declaratory judgment that held that the pollution exclu-
sion clause eliminated Reliance's liability on the policy.159 On appeal, 
the court found the damages covered because "[a]lthough, clearly, 
the operator of a parking garage must expect to release fumes into 
the facility itself, as well as into the air and streets, it is not equally 
clear that he should expect to release soot and fumes into adjacent 
residential structures."160 While the act of releasing soot and fumes 
into the air was expected and intended, the insured may not have 
expected or intended the exhaust to flow into the adjacent dwell-
ing. 161 Therefore, the sudden and accidental exception was not nec-
essarily inapplicable. 162 Similar reasoning has been applied in a case 
involving inadvertent drift of insecticide spray from one property to 
another. 163 In these and other cases, 164 the fact that the insured acted 
intentionally in doing the thing that caused damage is not decisive 
the resulting damage must in itself have been intended, expected or 
foreseen by the insured in order for the insurer to avoid coverage. 165 
When courts interpret "sudden and accidental" discharges to mean 
"unexpected and unintended" injuries, the pollution exclusion clause 
158 Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 95-96, 467 N.E.2d at 288. 
159 Id. at 96, 467 N.E.2d at 288-89. 
160 Id. at 98,467 N.E.2d at 290. 
161Id. 
162Id. 
163 Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 64 A.D.2d 1014, 409 N. Y.S.2d 294 (1978). In 
Bagley, the insurer attempted to deny coverage when chemicals sprayed by the insured on 
an oat farm spread to contaminate an adjacent vineyard. Noting that the defendants alleged 
that they exercised due care in spraying, the Bagley court held for the insured because 
"clearly, defendants did not intend to disperse the spray so as to cause damage to [the adjacent 
farmer] Bodine's grapes." Id. at 1014, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 296. The court found that while the 
discharge of the chemicals was an intentional act, the dispersal of the toxins onto the vineyard 
may have been sudden and accidental. 
164 See Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. 
Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (L. Div. 1982); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 
488-89, 426 N. Y.S.2d 603, 605 (App. Div. 1980) (dicta). 
165 See Jackson Township, 186 N.J. Super. at 165, 451 A.2d at 994. The Authority had 
continuously deposited wastes in a landfill. Id. at 159, 451 A.2d at 991. Residents charged the 
Authority and other defendants with negligently permitting the wastes to contaminate local 
groundwater. Id. The Jackson Township court held that the insurer had a duty to defend the 
Authority even though the contamination was gradual and continuous. Id. at 165, 451 A.2d 
at 994. So long as the damage was unexpected and unintended from the standpoint of the 
insured, the Jackson Township court found the damage to be sudden and accidental. Id. at 
164, 451 A.2d at 994. It viewed the continuous and intentional nature of the dumping to be 
irrelevant when interpreting the "sudden and accidental" exception of the pollution exclusion 
clause. See id. 
624 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:601 
becomes a mere restatement of the term "occurrence. "166 Such an 
interpretation results in the clause not excluding any events that 
meet the definition of occurrence. Courts see the words "an accident 
... which results . . . in bodily injury or property damage neither 
expected nor intended ... " in the definition of "occurrence" and the 
term "accidental" in the pollution exclusion clause, and interpret 
both "occurrence" and the exclusion as referring to the type of 
injury.167 While the term "occurrence" refers to an unexpected and 
unintended injury, the phrase "discharge, dispersal, release or es-
cape is sudden and accidental" plainly refers to the manner of dis-
charge. Thus, even though the phrase "sudden and accidental" can 
be equated with "unexpected and unintended," the "sudden and 
accidental" exception can be viewed as allowing coverage for unex-
'pected and unintended discharges and not unexpected and unin-
tended injuries. 168 Such a construction would allow the pollution 
exclusion clause to have meaning without frustrating the broad grant 
of coverage in the basic insurance agreement. 
The many possible meanings of the words "sudden and accidental" 
make unclear the precise intent of the parties to Comprehensive 
policy contracts. Insurance companies probably believed that the 
choice of the terms "sudden and accidental" in the pollution exclusion 
166 See 3 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, app. 58 (1987). Discussing the 
pollution exclusion, Long notes: 
It eliminates coverage for damages arising out of pollution or contamination, where 
such damages appear to be expected or intended on the part of the insured and hence 
are excluded by definition of "occurrence." Coverage is afforded for damages caused 
by pollution or contamination if the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape is sudden 
and accidental. 
Id. Courts citing Long for the proposition that the exclusion is merely a restatement of 
"occurrence" or citing cases that cite Long for this proposition include: American States Ins. 
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984); CPS Chern. Co. v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 569, 489 A.2d 1265, 1270 (L. Div. 1984), rev'd on 
other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (App. Div. 1985); Jackson Township, 186 
N.J. Super. at 162--64, 451 A.2d at 993-94; Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & 
Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127,133,477 N.E.2d 1227,1234 (1984); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. 
Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 714, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 100 
Wash. 2d 1018 (1983); see also Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 31, at 379. Courts that cite this 
passage from Long for the proposition that the exclusion only applies to "actual polluters" 
include: Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95,98-
99 (Ala. 1977); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415,418,439 N.Y.S.2d 538, 
540 (App. Div.), mot. for Iv. to app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608,427 N.E.2d 1191, 443 N.Y.S.2d 
1030 (1981). 
167 See, e.g., Jackson Township, 186 N.J. Super. at 164, 489 A.2d at 994; Klock Oil, 73 
A.D.2d at 488-89,426 N.Y.S.2d at 605. 
168 Compare Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 625 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (S.D. 
Fla. 1985) (coverage granted because insured did not expect nor intend discharge) with 
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 141, 711 P.2d 212, 214 (1985), review 
denied, 301 Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986) (coverage denied because insured intended discharge). 
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clause meant something like an instantaneous failure of facilities or 
procedures. 169 Despite the insurers' intent to have the pollution ex-
clusion clause restrict the meaning of the term "occurrence," the 
clause's "sudden and accidental" exception negates much of the ex-
clusion's restriction of "occurrence;" the "sudden and accidental" 
exception is an ambiguous exception that, under ordinary insurance 
law practices, courts construe strictly against the insurer. 170 The 
Comprehensive policy is an industry-wide document, not a contract 
form carefully tailored to the situation of the individual policyholder. 
It is therefore not surprising that ambiguities arise from the failure 
of the standardized policy to match insureds' situations. l7l Given the 
many possible interpretations of the words "sudden" and "acciden-
tal,"172 courts display reluctance to frustrate an insured's reasonable 
expectations of coverage. 173 
Since the "sudden and accidental" exception has been expanded 
to allow coverage for almost any occurrence, it is not surprising that 
this exception has been the focus of more comment174 than the subject 
169 See CPS Chern., 199 N.J. Super. at 569, 489 A.2d at 1270-71. Several commentators 
suggest that the pollution exclusion clause was drafted to limit occurrence-based liability for 
insurers in the growing number of environmental suits of the late 1960's. See, e.g., Hourihan, 
supra note 30, at 553; Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 766; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 
500. The Torrey Canyon disaster, the Santa Barbara oil spills, and the Grand River Lime 
case are some of the events cited as prompting the pollution exclusion clause. See supra notes 
45-54 and accompanying text. Thus, one insurance executive believed that with the addition 
of the pollution exclusion, the Comprehensive policy would still cover accidental discharges, 
"the sort of thing that can occur when equipment breaks down ... [but not a] company which 
knowingly dumps its wastes ... [because] such repeated actions ... are not insurable ex-
posures." C. Cox, Liability Insurance in the Era of the Consumer, a speech before the Annual 
Conference of the American Society of Insurance Management, in Bal Harbour, Fla. (April 
9, 1970), quoted in Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 767. 
Several authorities dispute whether the insurance industry actually intended to clearly 
declare that there would be no coverage for noninstantaneous pollution. See, e.g., Liability 
Coverage Standards, supra note 3, at 33,904 (at the time I.S.O. drafted the pollution exclusion 
clause, some insurers argued that the exclusion only served to confuse the definition of 
occurrence; thus the exclusion's ambiguity may be intentional); Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, 
supra note 30, at 349 ("choice of the terms 'sudden and accidental' appears almost as a 
calculated effort to assure ambiguity"). 
170 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Public Servo Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 651, 477 N.E.2d 
146, 149, review denied, 395 Mass. 1102,480 N.E.2d 24. (1985); CPS Chern., 199 N.J. Super. 
at 569, 489 A.2d at 1271; Van's Westlake, 34 Wash. App. at 712, 664 P.2d at 1265; see also 2 
COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.74. 
171 See Obremski, supra note 9, at 33. 
172 See supra notes 145-65 and accompanying text. 
17:l See Jackson Township Mun. Utils Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. 
Super. 156, 161, 451 A.2d 990, 992 (L. Div. 1982). 
174 Hadzi-Antich, supra note 121, at 790-95; Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 31, at 381-84; 
Last, supra note 3, at 10,254; Sparrow, supra note 3, at 171; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, 
at 507-14. 
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matter phrase of the pollution exclusion clause. 175 Focusing on the 
"sudden and accidental" exception may obscure analysis of the issues 
involved in considering whether a contamination injury is covered 
under a Comprehensive policy. 176 This section already has noted how 
some courts interpret the exception for sudden and accidental dis-
charges as referring to the type of injury instead of the manner of 
discharge. 177 The next section will discuss additional difficulties some 
courts have with interpreting the "sudden and accidental" exception 
and will conclude that these difficulties arise from these courts' 
failure to consider the Comprehensive policy as a whole. 178 
V. DIFFICULTIES IN INTERPRETING THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION 
CLAUSE 
The "sudden and accidental" language179 produces the few issues 
on which courts differ on the extent of the insured's coverage. 180 
Three questions recur: whether continuous releases over a period of 
time may be sudden and accidental within the meaning of the pol-
icy,181 whether the pleadings of the party injured by the insured 
must specifically allege that the contamination activity was sudden 
and accidental in order for the insured to be covered,182 and whether 
a court may infer that the insured should be denied coverage due to 
the foreseeability of the contamination-caused damage. 183 Each of 
these issues will be addressed in turn. Certain courts have had 
problems in interpreting the pollution exclusion clause because they 
have placed too great an emphasis on the interpretation of the "sud-
den and accidental" exception and too little emphasis on interpreting 
the term "occurrence" and the subject matter phrase. 184 
A. Insurability of Gradual Contamination 
Gradual or continuous contamination may occur in a number of 
ways. For example, continuous contamination may occur when a 
m See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
176 See infra notes 179-247 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 156-68 and accompanying text. 
178 See infra notes 179-258 and accompanying text. 
179 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra notes 110-65 and accompanying text for the issues on which there appears to 
be a consensus. 
181 See infra notes 185-222 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 223-37 and accompanying text. 
188 See infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text. 
184 See infra notes 185-237 and accompanying text. 
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business in the course of its operations intentionally and regularly 
discharges its waste into a river. The resulting contamination would 
be intentional. At the other extreme, continuous contamination may 
also occur when a container that is reasonably thought to be sound 
develops a slow leak that cannot be detected for months. Such a leak 
may not even be negligent. 
The basic coverage term "occurrence"185 and both phrases in the 
pollution exclusion clause's two phrases-the "subject matter" 
phrase and the "sudden and accidental" exceptionl86-together define 
coverage for all types of pollution-related injuries, including those 
injuries caused by gradual or continuous contamination. When a 
court focuses its analysis almost exclusively upon interpreting the 
"sudden and accidental" exception, it may ignore reasonable con-
strtlctions of the phrase that give meaning to the exception and 
preserve coverage for types of gradual pollution. For example, a 
court might overlook construing "sudden and accidental" to mean 
"unexpected and unintended" even though "unexpected and unin-
tended" is a reasonable interpretation consistent with "occur-
rence. "187 When a court looks at the phrase "sudden and accidental" 
out of context, it might not recognize that "sudden and accidental" 
need not mean an instantaneous happening unassociated with any 
act of human will. 188 By overemphasizing the "sudden and accidental" 
exception, some courts have improperly narrowed the scope of the 
exception, thus improperly narrowing the extent of insurance cov-
erage. 189 A broader, more systematic approach that takes into con-
sideration elements of the whole contract-the basic coverage, the 
scope of the pollution exclusion clause, and the exception to the 
clause-consistently with principles of insurance contract construc-
tion would permit the Comprehensive policy to cover some types of 
injuries that relate to gradual pollution. 
Courts that disallow coverage for continuous contamination activ-
ity reason that what they characterize as the common usage of the 
terms "sudden and accidental" controls interpretation of the excep-
185 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. 
188 See CPS Chern. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 569, 489 A.2d 1265, 
1270-71 (L. Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 295 A.2d 886 (App. Div. 
1985) (if insurers intended "sudden and accidental" to mean an immediate, short-term, dra-
matic catastrophe, they failed to express this meaning unambiguously). 
189 See infra notes 190-203 and accompanying text. 
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tion. 190 The appellate court in Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Insurance 
Co. determined that the meaning of "sudden and accidental" was so 
unambiguous that it could rule on the question without giving the 
insured an opportunity to brief the issue on remand. 191 Reliance had 
refused to defend Techalloy in the underlying suit, which alleged 
that Techalloy had contaminated the area well water over a twenty-
five year period by recklessly dumping and storing trichloroethy-
line. 192 The Techalloy court found that "it is immediately apparent 
that [the underlying complainant] did not allege a sudden event" 
because the complaint alleged pollution over twenty-five years. 193 
This and other courts equate "sudden and accidental" with instan-
taneous, regardless· of the insured's intent to discharge contami-
nants. 194 
Sometimes courts focus so exclusively on the terms "sudden and 
accidental" that they interpret the phrase "sudden and accidental" 
as being part of the definition of occurrence, even though the contract 
190 See, e.g., Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (lst 
Cir. 1984); American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 
1984); City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting Corp., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 344 N.W.2d 523 (Ct. 
App. 1983). 
191 See Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 12-15, 487 A.2d 820, 826-28 
(1984). The pollution exclusion clause was not thoroughly briefed on appeal because the lower 
court had denied coverage on another basis and did not address the pollution exclusion clause. 
See id. at 6, 487 A.2d at 823. The lower court had withheld coverage because it found no 
covered bodily injury. Id. Techalloy addressed the pollution exclusion clause in a footnote to 
its brief on appeal. Id. at 12, 487 A.2d at 826. The appellate court reversed the finding of no 
bodily injury, but then affirmed the lower court opinion on the basis of the pollution exclusion 
clause. Id. at 11, 15, 487 A.2d at 826-27. The appellate court found that, even though the 
issue of the pollution exclusion clause had not been discussed in Techalloy's brief, it could 
infer from the facts that the groundwater contamination was not sudden and accidental. Id. 
at 13, 487 A.2d at 826. The court noted, "Techalloy would have us judicially interpret a 
provision whose meaning here is unequivocal. Further, Techalloy offers no alternative inter-
pretation of 'sudden and accidental' which would render it ambiguous and capable of our 
interpretation." Id. at 14-15, 487 A.2d at 827. In its footnote briefing the pollution exclusion 
clause, appellant Techalloy relied on C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance 
Co., 640 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1981), as authority for interpreting the "sudden and accidental" 
exception. Techalloy, 338 Pa. Super. at 12-13, 487 A.2d at 826. The C.H. Heist court did not 
analyze whether the "sudden and accidental" exception applied to that case because it based 
its holding on the subject matter phrase of the pollution exclusion clause. See C .H. Heist, 640 
F.2d at 483 (duty to defend when the underlying complaint does not allege environmental 
contamination); see supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. 
192 Techalloy, 338 Pa. Super. at 5, 14, 487 A.2d at 822, 827. 
193Id. at 13, 487 A.2d at 827. 
194 See Great Lakes, 727 F.2d at 33-34; American States, 587 F. Supp. at 1553; Allied 
Smelting, 117 Wis. 2d at 385-86,344 N.W.2d at 527. 
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does not define occurrence in terms of "sudden and accidental. "195 
In American States Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 
for instance, the court stated that continuous releases of con-
taminants in its case were "not in any way sudden or acciden-
tal, and therefore do not even arguably state an occur-
rence."196 The court reached this conclusion even though the words 
"sudden and accidental" are part of the pollution exclusion clause 
and do not appear in the definition of "occurrence. "197 Furthermore, 
the court glossed over the fact that two of the policies in question 
defined "occurrence" to include continuous exposure to conditions 
and also the fact that the key policy in question during the period of 
dumping did not contain a pollution exclusion clause. 198 An additional 
sign of the American States court's confusion over the significance 
of the term "occurrence" is the court's reliance on persuasive prec-
edent regarding accident-based coverage199 for pollution200 when it 
195 See American States, 587 F. Supp. at 1553-54; see also Great Lakes, 727 F.2d at 33-34. 
196 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553-54 (E.D. Mich. 1984). American States and four other insurers 
issued Comprehensive policies covering National Drum and Barrel Corp. between JUly, 1966 
and October, 1982. In a series of private suits, plaintiffs alleged that National Drum produced 
toxic wastes that unidentified parties dumped at Detroit area sites during the period these 
policies were effective. The underlying plaintiffs turned to suing National Drum only after 
the owners of the dump site had refused to clean it up despite orders dating back to the early 
1970's. I d. at 1550-51. 
American States began to defend National Drum, advancing less than $65,000 in defense 
and settlement costs. American States then attempted to bind the other insurers to defending 
National Drum. Id. The American States court found that none of the insurers, including 
American States, had a duty to defend National Drum. The court held that there was no 
occurrence because the release of the wastes was not sudden and accidental in the sense the 
phrase was used in the Comprehensive policies. Id. at 1553-54. 
197Id. at 1552; see also supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (standard Comprehensive 
policy definition of occurrence). 
198 American States, 587 F. Supp. at 1552. The pollution exclusion clause and its "sudden 
and accidental" language do not appear in any policy until after October, 1970. Id. The court 
even noted that National Drum used the sites only between 1968 and 1970, id. at 1553, but 
still managed to read a "sudden and accidental" requirement into the definition of occurrence 
in the pre-1970 policies. 
199 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text for a comparison of accident-based policies 
and occurrence-based policies. 
200 587 F. Supp. at 1552. The court looked at the definition of accident in Black's Law 
Dictionary. I d. 
[A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening; an event happening without any 
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency an event 
which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it 
happens; an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for event, hap-
pening or occurrence; an unusual or unexpected result attending the operation or 
performance of a usual or necessary act or event; chance or contingency; fortune; 
mishap; some sudden and unexpected event taking place without expectation, upon 
the instant, rather than something which continues, progresses or develops; some-
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was reviewing claims for coverage under occurrence-based201 Com-
prehensive policies. 
The cited cases did not clarify the term "occurrence" because most 
authorities recognize that occurrence-based policies cover more 
events than accident-based policies. 202 The American States court is 
silent on the issue of whether the insured expected or intended the 
operator of the waste sites in question to release the insured's waste. 
American States and other decisions denying coverage for gradual 
pollution do not emphasize that the contaminant discharges were 
foreseeable or expected-instead these decisions emphasize that the 
continuous nature of the contamination is decisive by itself. 203 
thing happening by chance; something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual, extraordi-
nary or phenomenal, taking place not according to the usual course of things or 
events, out of the range of ordinary calculations; that which exists or occurs abnor-
mally, or an uncommon occurrence. 
Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 14 (5th ed. 1979)). The American States court also cited 
three cases that held that the release of contaminants in the course of business is not an 
insurable accident. Id. (citing American Casualty Co. v. Minnesota Farm Bureau Servs. Co., 
270 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1959); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 205 Okla. 618, 
239 P.2d 754 (1951); Clark v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 21 Wis. 2d 268, 124 N.W.2d 
29 (1963)). 
201 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the term "occurrence" 
as used in the Comprehensive policy. 
202 E.g., Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 80, 323 S.E.2d 726, 
731 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986); Buckeye Union Ins. 
Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 131, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 
(1984); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 713, 664 P.2d 
1262, 1266, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983); 11 COUCH, supra note 5, § 44.285; 
Hourihan, supra note 30, at 552; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 499; Note, supra note 1, 
at 914-15. Even under accident based coverage, many courts found that gradual pollution 
damage was insurable. Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 765 n.11. 
The American States decision is distinct from most other cases concerning the pollution 
exclusion clause in a number of procedural aspects. The first unusual aspect of this case is 
that one insurer, American States, began to defend the insured before bringing suit against 
the other insurers. In defending the insured, American States advanced less than $65,000, 
which is a nominal amount in comparison to the potential liability insurers face in most pollution 
cases. A second quirk was that the sole plaintiff seeking to impose a duty to defend on the 
remaining insurers was American States. National Drum was a co-defendant with the other 
insurers. The judgment was for the defendants, holding that none of the insurers had a duty 
to defend. This result was advantageous to the plaintiff in two ways: first, American States 
was under no obligation to continue to defend National Drum in the remaining unsettled 
pollution suits; and second, American States could cite the judgment as favorable precedent 
in future pollution exclusion clause cases when it seeks to avoid defending insureds. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, American States has not appealed this decision even though it goes against 
most other interpretations of the pollution exclusion clause. 
203 See Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33--34 
(1st Cir. 1984); American States, 587 F. Supp. at 1553; City of Milwaukee v. Allied Smelting 
Corp., 117 Wis. 2d 377, 385-86, 344 N.W.2d 523, 527 (Ct. App. 1983). 
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A more systematic analysis of the Comprehensive policy and its 
pollution exclusion clause would support at least some claims for 
coverage of gradual contamination. 204 In Buckeye Union Mutual 
Insurance Co. v Liberty Solvents and Chemicals Co., the court was 
careful to analyze the term "occurrence" separately from the "sudden 
and accidental" exception. 205 The case involved Buckeye's refusal to 
defend or indemnify Liberty Solvents in the Chern-Dyne Superfund 
suit. 206 Wastes leaking from the Chern-Dyne site had contaminated 
the soil and water, and the United States and Ohio had sued parties 
who had left wastes with Chem-Dyne. 207 In the suit between Buck-
eye and Liberty Solvents, the Liberty Solvents court first analyzed 
whether the allegations of gradual pollution in the underlying com-
plaint constituted an occurrence. 208 The court concluded that an ac-
tivity that results in unexpected damage is an occurrence regardless 
of whether the damage was sudden.209 The court then interpreted 
the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion 
clause, because the alleged discharges in the underlying complaint 
clearly were industrial pollution to which the exclusion applied. 210 In 
its review of the Chern-Dyne complaint, the Liberty Solvents court 
found no allegation that compelled it to conclude that Liberty Sol-
vents expected or intended gradual waste leaks. 211 Because the rea-
sonable construction most favorable to the insured of "sudden and 
accidental" would equate that phrase with "unexpected and unin-
tended," the Liberty Solvents court held that Buckeye had to defend 
Liberty Solvents in the Chern-Dyne suit. 212 
While both "occurrence" and the "sudden and accidental" excep-
tion are part of the definition of coverage,213 they perform different 
204 By a systematic approach to pollution exclusion claims, what is meant is interpreting 
each element of the coverage definition according to its purpose. The elements are the term 
"occurrence" and the phrases in the pollution exclusion clause. See infra 248-58 and accom-
panying text. 
205 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984). 
206 Id. at 128, 477 N.E.2d at 1229-30. 
207Id. at 127-28, 477 N.E.2d at 1229. 
208Id. at 131, 477 N.E.2d at 1232. 
209 Id. at 132, 477 N.E.2d at 1233. The Liberty Solvents court cited favorably Grand River 
Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 269 N.E.2d 360 (1972), a significant 
early national precedent on interpreting whether gradual pollution constituted an occurrence. 
Liberty Solvents, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 131, 477 N.E.2d at 1232-33. 
210 For a discussion of the type of discharge to which the pollution exclusion clause applies, 
see the discussion of the clause's "subject matter phrase" supra notes 110-35 and accompany-
ing text. 
211 Liberty Solvents, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 134, 477 N.E.2d at 1235. 
212Id. 
213 See supra notes 37-65 and accompanying text. 
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functions. "Occurrence" grants coverage for continuous and repeated 
exposures to conditions. 214 The "sudden and accidental" exception is 
part of the pollution exclusion clause,215 which is a provision that 
denies coverage. Ordinarily, under insurance contract construction 
principles, any provision that denies coverage is limited to its ex-
pressed terms.216 Such a principle is necessary to avoid defeating 
the primary purpose of the contract-indemnification of losses. 217 
While courts that find no coverage ostensibly base their decisions 
upon the common meaning of the phrase "sudden and accidental,"218 
which they equate to "instantaneous," their decisions do not address 
other common meanings of that phrase that might suggest a broader 
coverage that is consistent with the meaning of "occurrence." The 
policy defines "occurrence" as including continuous events. "Sudden 
and accidental" can often be equated with unexpected, unintended, 
and unforeseen, and such meanings encompass continuous as well as 
instantaneous events. 219 For example, an activity may be a contin-
uous, regular part of a company's business but the company may not 
intend or expect the activity to lead to a release into the environ-
ment.220 Whether the release in this instance would be "sudden and 
accidental" is ambiguous. 
Ordinary contract interpretation principles would suggest that 
ambiguities in meaning be held against the insurer.221 The phrase 
214 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text; see also Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 
498-99; 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 1. 72. 
215 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
216 E.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 96, 467 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1984); 
Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 
156, 161, 451 A.2d 990, 992 (L. Div. 1982); 12 COUCH, supra note 5, § 44A.3. 
217 E.g., United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 714, 664 
P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983) ("rather than ... render[ing) a 
policy nonsensical or ineffective ... ambiguity should be resolved so that a doubtful provision 
in a contract will not unfairly devour the whole policy or relieve the insurer from liability 
fairly within the spirit of the policy."); 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.26. 
218 See supra notes 190-203 and accompanying text. 
219 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 11 (1976) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S 
THIRD) (accidental defined in part as "happening or ensuing without design, intent, or obvious 
motivation or through inattention or carelessness"); id. at 2284 (sudden defined as "happening 
without previous notice or with very brief notice[;) coming or occurring unexpectedly[;) not 
foreseen or prepared for"). 
220 See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 98, 467 N.E.2d 287,290 (1984) 
(spread of exhaust fumes from public garage to adjacent condominium potentially unexpected 
and unintended, therefore, insurer had duty to defend); Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. 
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 164, 451 A.2d 990, 994 (L. Div. 
1982) (depositing wastes at a dump intentional but seeping of chemicals from dump site 
potentially unexpected and unintended from standpoint of a municipal utility); Liberty Sol-
vents, 17 Ohio App. 3d at 134, 477 N.E.2d at 1235; Last, supra note 3, at 10,254. 
221 See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text; see also Techalloy, 338 Pa. Super. at 11 
n.2, 487 A.2d at 826 n.2 (gossamer thin possibility of coverage sufficient for duty to defend). 
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"sudden and accidental" is ambiguous because a court can reasonably 
construe it to mean something other than instantaneous and without 
human intervention. 222 Constructions favoring coverage for some 
gradual pollution are more solidly based in insurance law than those 
decisions that deny coverage because such constructions apply the 
terms of the policy consistently with the objective intent of the 
contract. 
B. The Burden of Establishing Sudden and Accidental 
Contamination 
Another issue on which courts differ is whether a third party 
complaint223 must mention sudden and accidental pollution in order 
for the insurer to have a duty to defend.224 Ordinarily, a court com-
pares the third party complaint to the wording of the policy to 
determine whether the alleged injury is covered.225 The problem for 
courts considering pollution exclusion cases is that third party com-
plaints will often be silent on whether the pollution was sudden and 
accidental when such an allegation is not a part of an injured party's 
theory of recovery.226 Such omissions in the pleadings force a court 
222 E.g., Shapiro v. Public Servo Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 652, 477 N.E.2d 
146, 150, review denied, 395 Mass. 1102, 480 N.E.2d 24 (1985); Allstate Ins. CO. V. Klock Oil 
Co., 73 A.D.2d 486,488,426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (App. Div. 1980); see BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 14 (5th ed. 1979) (" ... an event happening without any human agency, or if happening 
wholly or partly through human agency an event which under the circumstances is unusual 
and unexpected by the person to whom it happens; an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, 
unforeseen or unlooked for event, happening or occurrence; an unusual or unexpected result 
attending the operation or performance of a usual or necessary act or event ... "). But see 
American States, 587 F. Supp. at 1552. 
2".<3 The third party complaint is the complaint by the injured party against the insured for 
which the insured seeks to invoke the duties to defend and indemnify. See supra notes 103-
04 and accompanying text. 
224 Compare Great Lakes Container Corp. V. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 
33-34 (1st Cir. 1984) (no coverage absent allegations of sudden and accidental discharge) with 
Reliance Ins. CO. V. Martin, 126 Ill. App. 3d 94, 98, 467 N.E.2d 287, 290 (1984) (duty to 
defend when facts unclear as to whether pollution was sudden and accidental). 
225 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 224 (Me. 1980); Smith, 
Rodburg & Chesler, supra note 30, at 331. 
226 See Hourihan, supra note 30, at 553-54. In cases brought under two major federal 
statutes addressing hazardous waste releases, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. III 1985) ("RCRA"), and the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) ("CERCLA" 
or "Superfund"), plaintiffs need not allege sudden and accidental discharges as part of their 
claims. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6973, 9607 (1982). Thus, in several instances, insurers have had to 
defend cases against insureds based on these statutes. See Idaho V. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. 
Supp. 1064, 1073, 1076 (D. Idaho 1986) (underlying CERCLA case: Idaho V. Bunker Hill Co., 
635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986)); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. 
Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984) (underlying CERCLA case: United States 
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to decide whether the insurer or the insured should bear the burden 
of the third party's silence. 227 
Courts finding for insurers have placed the burden of omissions in 
third party complaints on the insureds. 228 Such omissions by the 
injured parties have been termed "significant"229 and have served as 
a basis for saying pollution injuries were not sudden and acciden-
tal. 230 
The difficulty with a court using silence in a third party complaint 
to deny coverage for a pollution injury is that the burden of estab-
lishing that an exclusion clause applies falls ordinarily, and should 
fall, on the insurer and not the insured. 231 Rather than denying 
coverage when injured third parties fail to allege sudden and acci-
dental injury, customary allocation of burdens would require that 
v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983)); see aLso Last, supra note 3, at 
10,254 (many insurers now defending parties to CERCLA suits); cf. CPS Chern. Co. v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 203 N.J. Super. 15, 20, 495 A.2d 886, 889 (App. Div. 1985) (pendent 
state law intentional tort claims in a CERCLA suit preclude summary judgment for insured 
on issue of duty to defend) (underlying CERCLA case: City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. 
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982)). But see Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National 
Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (lst Cir. 1984) (underlying CERCLA case: United States v. 
Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985»; Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless 
Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986), rev'g, 72 N.C. App. 80, 323 S.E.2d 726 (1984) 
(underlying RCRA suit: United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984). 
CERCLA claims for l'eimbursement of the government's response costs under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607 also raise the issue of whether these claims are damages in the sense the term is used 
in the Comprehensive policy. Compare Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical 
& Chern. Co., 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987) (response costs are insurable damages) with Mraz 
v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986) (response costs are not insurable). 
See supra note 65 for a discussion of the different reasoning. 
227 Much of the litigation surrounding the pollution exclusion clause involves the duty to 
defend. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text. Cases construing the duty to defend 
under the clause are often brought on motions for summary judgment that are based on the 
underlying complaints. See, e.g., Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 
401, 403, 456 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (App. Div. 1982); A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co., 
Inc. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 892, 632 P.2d 1377, 1378 (1981), aff'd, 293 Or. 17, 643 P.2d 
1260 (1982). 
228 See American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. 
Mich. 1984). 
229 [d. at 1553. The American States court noted that the underlying suits did not allege 
the manner in which the wastes were dumped nor even that the dumping was a regular part 
of National Drum's operations. Nevertheless, it found "it is significant that it is never even 
suggested that the dumping was unintended, unexpected, sudden or by accident." [d. 
230 See Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 
(1st Cir. 1984); Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 
383 (1986). 
231 Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415,420-21,439 N.Y.S.2d 538,542 
(App. Div.), mot. for Lv. to app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608, 427 N:E.2d 1191, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1030 
(1981); see, e.g., Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1018, 134 Cal. 
Rptr. 904, 907-08 (1977); 12 COUCH, supra note 5, § 44A.3. 
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courts deny coverage only if third parties specifically allege that 
their injuries were not sudden and accidental. 232 
One reason the burden ordinarily falls on the insurer is because 
under modern notice pleading, a complaint need not fully detail 
allegations beyond those required to state a cause of action. 233 As 
one court noted, 
'Precision' is not required in the complaint, and it is not necessary 
for determining a duty to defend. The correct test is whether a 
potential for liability within the coverage appears from whatever 
allegations are made . . . . 
A defendant has no power to amend a complaint which contains 
an incomplete statement of facts. Whether he can obtain a de-
fense from his insurer must depend not on the caprice of the 
plaintiff's draftsmanship, nor the limits of his knowledge, but on 
a potential shown in the complaint that the facts ultimately 
proved may come within the coverage. 234 
A vaguely phrased complaint may encompass a covered injury with-
out specifically mentioning that the injury was caused by sudden and 
accidental pollution. 235 An insured does not control the drafting of 
the injured party's complaint, therefore the insured has limited abil-
ity to clarify ambiguous or omitted allegations. 236 Moreover, the 
"sudden and accidental" exception is part of an exclusion clause, so 
the insurer should have to show that the exception is clearly not 
applicable in order to overcome a presumption in favor of coverage 
and to exclude coverage for contamination-related injuries. 237 While 
most courts will allow coverage if the third party complaint alleges 
potentially unexpected and unintended pollution discharges or inju-
232 See supra note 98-101 and accompanying text. 
233 Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 647 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (D. Idaho 1986); Travelers Indem. 
Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220,225 (Me. 1980); Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 
72 N.C. App. 80, 323 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1984), rev'd, 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986). 
234 Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 226 (emphasis in original). The Maine court first decided that the 
release of chemicals at the dump site operated by Dingwell may have been sudden and 
accidental even when the substances allegedly "permeated" the ground and water after 
release. [d. at 224. 
235 See id. at 226. 
236 [d.; see also Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 80, 323 S.E.2d 
726, 730 (1984), rev'd, 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (1986) (legally sufficient underlying 
complaints may lack adequate detail to permit a court to determine coverage by precisely 
comparing the complaint to the insurance policy); cf. Bunker Hill, 647 F. Supp. at 1067-68 
(insured should not have the burden of clarifying in advance of the underlying litigation 
whether the complaint states an insurable claim because the costs associated with clarifying 
a complaint would frustrate a basic purpose of a duty to defend clause-protection of the 
insured from litigation expenses). 
237 See Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, supra note 30, at 332; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 
513; see also supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
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ries, courts differ on the extent to which allegations or trial findings 
regarding the foreseeability of contaminant discharges or pollution 
injuries have an impact on either the duty to defend or the duty to 
indemnify. 
C. Role of Foreseeability in Interpreting the Pollution Exclusion 
Clause 
The final issue on which courts differ is on how foreseeable dis-
charges must be for those discharges and related injuries not to be 
sudden and accidental. 238 When courts view releases as highly fore-
seeable, they have denied coverage in a few cases. 239 One court found 
pollutant discharges highly foreseeable when an insurer warned an 
insured of the potential for injuries arising out of an industrial pro-
cess. 240 In addition, highly foreseeable risks are those that are plainly 
apparent to a company even without an insurer's warning.241 For 
example, when a company knew its plant's emissions systems re-
peatedly failed and the escaped emissions created poor visibility on 
a public highway, a resulting traffic accident was not sudden and 
accidental because it was highly foreseeable. 242 
Courts do not always address the question of foreseeability when 
they grant243 or deny244 coverage. Judge Keeton suggests that highly 
238 Judge Keeton characterized the issue of the impact of foreseeability on the insurability 
of a risk as a question of the degree of foreseeability. When an outcome is so highly foreseeable 
that it becomes like a cost of business, then it becomes uninsurable. R. KEETON, supra note 
24, § 5.3(a). 
239 See Barmet, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Techalloy 
Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1,487 A.2d 820 (1984); see also Great Lakes Container 
Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (lst Cir. 1984). 
240 Techalloy, 338 Pa. Super. at 14, 487 A.2d at 827. Reliance Insurance warned Techalloy 
that its use of trichloroethylene contaminated the groundwater. Seeid. at 6, 487 A.2d at 823. 
Also, Techalloy knew of the contamination because it had the warned the public of it two 
years before the third party suit. Id. at 14, 487 A.2d at 827. The Techalloy court did not 
ground its decision on this fact, though. Instead, it viewed the continuity of the practice for 
twenty-five years as proof that the injuries were not "sudden." [d. 
241 See Barmet, 425 N.E.2d at 203. 
242 Barmet, 425 N.E.2d at 202-03. In Barmet, the appellate court affirmed the denial of 
coverage due to the pollution exclusion clause when the trial court determined that the escape 
of gases that obscured visibility on a highway was foreseeable and resulted in a foreseeable 
automobile accident. [d. Both parties in Barmet presented evidence on the operation of the 
emission filtration system for the gases. [d. at 202. The trial court found that the escape was 
foreseeable and therefore not sudden and accidental. [d. at 202-03. The appeals court affirmed 
because the fact findings were not clearly erroneous and that on the basis of the facts the car 
crash was foreseeable. [d. 
243 In Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. V. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. 
Super. 156, 451 A.2d 990 (L. Div. 1982), the court did not explain why it was not foreseeable 
that chemicals would leak from a dump site into an aquifer. 
244 See Great Lakes Container Corp. V. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33--34 
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foreseeable injuries approximate the expected and intended costs of 
doing business, and therefore should be uninsurable. 245 This ap-
proach would hold that when a contamination injury is highly fore-
seeable, it becomes less unexpected and less accidental. 246 When a 
contaminant discharge is highly foreseeable, it too would be less 
unexpected and unintended. Thus, the Comprehensive policy would 
not cover highly foreseeable injuries because they would not be 
"occurrences," and the policy would not cover highly foreseeable 
industrial discharges into the environment because such discharges 
would not be "sudden and accidental." Such an interpretation gives 
meaning to all the terms of the contract247 without eliminating most 
coverage. The question of foreseeability should be part of a court's 
systematic analysis of the entire Comprehensive policy. 
When a court that seeks to honor all the terms of a Comprehensive 
policy analyzes whether a contract covers a contamination-related 
injury, such a court should recognize that the term "occurrence" and 
the two parts of the pollution exclusion clause address different 
aspects of the coverage question. A systematic analytical approach 
to the contract would have courts first assess the breadth of the 
term "occurrence" to determine what types of injuries the policy 
would cover absent the exclusion. 248 Under this approach, the first 
question should be whether there was unexpected and unintended 
damage from the standpoint of the insured.249 Such damage would 
(lst Cir. 1984). In Great Lakes, it would have been possible for the court to determine from 
the complaint that Great Lakes had notice and should have foreseen the contamination of the 
aquifer under the industrial site. The underlying complaint alleged that Great Lakes and other 
operators of the site discharged chemicals onto the ground over the aquifer and had discon-
tinued using on-site drinking water wells. [d. at 33. Pollution was highly foreseeable when 
the company spilled chemicals it knew to be hazardous onto the site and allowed the wastes 
to seep into the ground. Actual notice of the hazard can be shown by Great Lakes abandoning 
use of its own wells for drinking water due to chemical taint. Such an analysis would make 
the Great Lakes court consistent with the majority of pollution exclusion clause opinions but 
was not expressed as the rationale behind its holding. See Last, supra note 3, at 10,254 (Great 
Lakes consciously permitted known hazardous waste to seep into ground thereby causing 
predictable contamination; decision consistent with equating sudden with unexpected). 
245 R. KEETON, supra note 24, § 5.4(c). 
246 [d.; see 11 COUCH, supra note 5, § 44.285; Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, supra note 30, at 
355. 
"47 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
248 See Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 509. See generally CPS Chern. Co., Inc. v. 
Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265 (L. Div. 1984), rev'd per curiam on 
other grounds, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 A.2d 886 (App. Div. 1985); Buckeye Union Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., Inc., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984), 
for cases applying the systematic analysis suggested infra notes 249-58 and accompanying 
text. 
249 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
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be an occurrence. 250 If there is an occurrence, then the court's anal-
ysis should focus on whether the contaminating discharge that 
caused the injury is within the subject matter of the pollution exclu-
sion clause. 251 Under prevailing case law, the pollution exclusion 
clause would not apply in the following three situations: 1) the con-
tamination arises outside an industrial context;252 2) the discharge 
does not enter the land, water or air;253 or 3) the circumstances 
surrounding the purchase of the policy indicate that the insured 
reasonably expected the policy to cover the event. 254 Coverage 
should be permitted in these cases because the cause of the contam-
ination injury would not be a discharge of the type that the pollution 
exclusion clause describes as its subject matter.255 Finally, if the 
occurrence is within the subject matter of the pollution exclusion 
clause, then consideration should turn to the "sudden and accidental" 
exception. 256 If the discharge or discharges in question are unex-
pected and unintended, then there should be coverage.257 If the 
discharge that causes injury is expected, intended or highly foresee-
able, and is within the subject matter of the pollution exclusion 
clause, then the clause eliminates coverage. 258 
Interpreting the contract systematically preserves meaning for all 
the parts of the contract. The term "occurrence" would grant cov-
erage for a type of injury. The subject matter phrase of the pollution 
250 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of coverage for pollution 
injuries under "occurrence" policies that had no pollution exclusion clause. 
251 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra notes 124--30 and accompanying text. 
254 See supra notes 131--35 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra notes 145-73 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. 
258 See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212 (1985), review denied, 
301 Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986). The Sunnes court distinguished between unintentional damage 
and intentional discharges when it denied indemnification to a company that discharged acids 
and caustic wastes into a municipal sewer. See id. at 140, 711 P.2d at 214. The insurer had 
refused to defend or indemnify the business when the city commenced a suit for damage to 
the sewers. The court recognized that the damage was an occurrence because the parties to 
the insurance suit stipulated that the damage was unintended by the insured. The parties also 
had stipulated that the discharges were intentional. The Sunnes court denied coverage on the 
basis of the pollution exclusion clause, because the court recognized that the focus of the 
pollution exclusion clause is the question of whether the discharge is intentional. [d. The court 
distinguished A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 632 P.2d 
1377, aff'd, 293 Or. 17,643 P.2d 1260 (1982), by noting that Sunnes involved the discharge of 
substances specifically mentioned in the pollution exclusion clause. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. at 
139, 711 P.2d at 214. The Sunnes court preserved a meaning for the pollution exclusion clause 
by recognizing that the clause bars coverage for intentional industrial discharges. See id. at 
140-41, 711 P.2d at 214. 
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exclusion clause would exclude coverage for a described type of 
discharge. The "sudden and accidental" exception would narrow the 
type of discharge excluded by creating an exception for discharges 
that arise in a particular manner. 
VI. REVISIONS IN THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE UNDER 
THE COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 
In response to the fact that the Comprehensive policy's pollution 
exclusion clause was ambiguously written, and was therefore inef-
fective in barring coverage for many contamination-related inju-
ries,259 I. S. O. 260 redrafted the pollution exclusion clause in the Com-
mercial General Liability Policy of 1985. 261 The major changes in the 
redrafted pollution exclusion clause are the elimination of the "sud-
den and accidental" exception262 and the rewording of the phrase 
describing the clause's subject matter.263 This Comment will analyze 
the effectiveness of the new pollution exclusion clause first by re-
viewing the changes in wording. 264 Then, it will apply the new lan-
guage to fact patterns decided under the old pollution exclusion 
clause to highlight potential interpretive issues. 265 Such an applica-
tion indicates that the redrafted pollution exclusion clause fails to 
address adequately the basis of several decisions that limited the 
subject matter of the Comprehensive policy's pollution exclusion 
clause. 
A. Redrafted Language of the Pollution Exclusion Clause 
The pollution exclusion clause of the 1985 Commercial policy elim-
inates all coverage for injuries caused by pollutants emanating from 
259 See, e.g., A-I Sandblasting & Steam cleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 896, 632 
P.2d 1377, 1380 (1981), aff'd, 293 Or. 17, 643 P.2d 1260 (1982); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's 
Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 712, 664 P.2d 1262, 1265, review denied, 100 Wash. 
2d 1018 (1983); Sparrow, supra note 3, at 171; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 520; see also 
Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 
156, 164-65, 451 A.2d 990, 994 (L. Div. 1982) (alternative language would make coverage 
issues beyond reasonable question). 
260 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for a description of ISO. 
261 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 25, at 1. 
262 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text for this provision in the Comprehensive 
policy. 
263 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text for this provision in the Comprehensive 
policy. An additional major change is the provision for an alternative to coverage based on 
the term "occurrence"-the so-called "claims made" coverage. Such coverage eliminates "long-
tail" liability. See supra note 34. 
264 See infra notes 266-80 and accompanying text. 
265 See infra notes 281-329 and accompanying text. 
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certain sources or arising out of certain activities, regardless of 
whether the contamination was sudden and accidental. 266 The new 
clause reads: 
This insurance does not apply to . . . 
f.(I) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the 
actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape of pollutants: 
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy; 
(b) At or from any site or location used by or for you or others 
for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of 
waste; 
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled, stored, treated, 
disposed of, or processed as waste by or for you or any person 
or organization for whom you may be legally responsible; or 
(d) At or from any site or location on which you or any contrac-
tors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your 
behalf are performing operations: 
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location in 
connection with such operations; or 
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, remove, 
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize the pollutants. 
(2) Any loss, cost, or expense arising out of any governmental 
direction or request that you test for, monitor, clean up, remove, 
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants. 
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant 
or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, al-
kalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be re-
cycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. 267 
Under the redrafted pollution exclusion clause, the excluded contam-
ination injury may be the result of alleged or threatened emission of 
"pollutants" and need not be the result of actual contamination. 268 
The word "pollutants" is the general term for emissions that the 
policy will not cover. The policy defines "pollutants" in a separate 
paragraph set out in text within the pollution exclusion clause. 269 In 
addition, the redrafted pollution exclusion clause specifically men-
tions that the cost of government-ordered cleanups performed by 
the insured are not covered. 270 
266 See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 25, at 5. 
267 Commercial Coverage Form, supra note 36, at 2 (exclusion f). 
268Id. (exclusion f(1)); cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text (1978 pollution exclusion). 
269 "Pollutants mean ... any irritant or contaminant, including .... " Commercial Coverage 
Form, supra note 36, at 2 (exclusion 0. 
27°Id. (exclusion f(2)). The language in exclusion f(2) does not eliminate coverage for all 
costs associated with CERCLA response actions. The exclusionary language applies to "[a]ny 
loss, cost, or expense arising out of any governmental direction or request that you . .. clean 
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The redrafted pollution exclusion clause provides more limits on 
the types of emissions that general liability insurance covers than 
the 1973 version. 271 While its predecessor did not address solid and 
thermal irritants, the new policy specifically describes these emis-
sions as pollutants. 272 Unlike the pollution exclusion clause in the 
Comprehensive policy, the redrafted clause does not mention that 
the emission must enter "into or upon land, the atmosphere or any 
water course or body of water. "273 Instead, the policy eliminates 
coverage for discharges from a series of specified sites. 274 The clause 
specifies that there is no coverage for discharges from sites an in-
sured owns, rents or occupies, sites used for the handling of waste, 
and sites on which contractors bring pollutants on an insured's be-
half.275 The list of these sites and the inclusion of "pollutants ... 
which are ... transported ... as waste" is an attempt to exclude 
coverage for all discharges associated with the "cradle to grave" 
processing of pollutants. 276 
up ... pollutants." ld. (emphasis added). Under CERCLA, federal and state governments 
have the option either to order responsible parties to clean up a site or to clean up a site 
themselves and then seek reimbursement from responsible parties. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9604, 
9606, 9607 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). Thus, if a government chooses the latter response 
option, then the government would not be directing you, the responsible party, to clean up 
pollutants. If the government performs the cleanup and seeks reimbursement, then the costs 
of reimbursement may be insurable. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical 
& Chern. Co., 811 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1987). But see Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 
804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1985) (alternate holding). Exclusion f(2) would not eliminate insurer 
liability under the citizen suit provision of the amendments to CERCLA passed by the 99th 
Congress. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 
§ 206, 1986 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1613, 1703 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9659). Costs imposed on a defendant in a citizen suit would not arise out of "governmental 
direction or request" and therefore are not excluded from coverage by reason of exclusion 
f(2). 
If exclusion f(l) or the basic insurance agreement eliminated all CERCLA liability, then 
exclusion f(2) would be redundant and there would be coverage for neither citizen suits nor 
governmental requests for reimbursement. If exclusion f(2) is not redundant, then insurers 
may be liable for costs associated with CERCLA citizen suits and governmental response 
actions. 
271 Cf. supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
272 Cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. 
274 Commercial Coverage Form, supra note 36, at 2 (exclusion f(1)(a)-(d)). 
2751d. 
276 The language of exclusion f(l)(c) appears to include specifically those situations where 
waste was turned over to another company for disposal. See American States Ins. Co. v. 
Maryland Casualty-Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549 (E.D. Mich. 1984); CPS Chern. Co. v. Continental 
Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 489 A.2d 1265 (L. Div. 1984), rev'd, 203 N.J. Super. 15, 495 
A.2d 886 (App. Div. 1985); Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 72 N.C. App. 80, 
323 S.E.2d 726 (1984), rev'd, 315 N.C. 688, 340 A.2d 374 (1986); Buckeye Union Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Liberty Solvents & Chems. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 127, 477 N.E.2d 1227 (1984). 
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The most prominent revision in the pollution exclusion clause of 
the 1985 Commercial policy is the elimination of the "sudden and 
accidental" exception. 277 This change alone eliminates many of the 
ambiguities cited by courts that found coverage under the pollution 
exclusion clause of the 1973 Comprehensive policy.278 As discussed,279 
however, several courts decided cases on the basis of the old pollution 
exclusion clause's subject matter phrase and not on the basis of the 
exclusion's "sudden and accidental" exception. 280 The next section 
will analyze fact patterns of cases under the Comprehensive policy 
to determine whether the wording of the Commercial policy would 
restrict coverage in similar situations. 
B. Effectiveness of the Redrafted Clause as a Limit on Coverage 
The omission of the "sudden and accidental" exception from the 
redrafted pollution exclusion clause in the Commercial policy does 
not eliminate all grounds on which courts found coverage for contam-
ination injuries under the old policy.281 Through consideration of the 
old pollution exclusion clause's scope, courts found coverage on three 
additional grounds: (1) the pollution was non-industrial,282 (2) the 
contamination was non-environmental,283 or (3) the injury was rea-
sonably expected to be covered. 284 
277 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 25, at 5; cf. supra notes 62--64 and accompanying 
text. 
278 See supra notes 145-247 and accompanying text. 
279 See supra notes 110-35 and accompanying text. 
280 See, e.g., C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479 (3d 
Cir. 1981); Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 
(Ala. 1977); A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 632 P.2d 1377 
(1981), afl'd, 293 Or. 17,643 P.2d 1260 (1982); see also Smith, Rodburg & Chesler, supra note 
30, at 350-52; Note, supra note 11, at 1258 n.105. 
281 See supra notes 110-35 and accompanying text. 
282 Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95, 99 
(Ala. 1977); Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401,409,456 N. Y.S.2d 
504, 506 (App. Div. 1982); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 420-21, 
439 N.Y.S.2d 538,541-42 (App. Div.), mot. for Lv. to app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608,427 N.E.2d 
1191, 443 N. Y.S.2d 1030 (1981); see supra notes 110-23 and accompanying text. 
283 C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 
1981); Connor v. Farmer, 382 So. 2d 1069, 1069-70 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 
267 (La. 1980); Clement v. Taylor, 382 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. Ct. App. 1980); see supra notes 
124-30 and accompanying text. 
284 Niagara County at 419-20, 439 N. Y.S.2d at 541; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 
A.D.2d 486,489,439 N.Y.S.2d 603,605 (App. Div. 1980); A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning 
Co. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 894, 632 P.2d 1377, 1379 (1981), afl'd, 293 Or. 17, 643 P.2d 
1260 (1982); see supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
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The redrafted pollution exclusion clause does not clearly preclude 
courts from utilizing these same three grounds to find coverage for 
a pollution-related injury.285 The ambiguities underlying these three 
grounds still remain. The first ambiguity concerns whether the de-
scription of the terms "irritant or contaminant" so closely approxi-
mates the language of the old policy that these terms continue to 
encompass only industrial emissions. 286 A second ambiguity is 
whether the use of the term "pollutant" still implies that only envi-
ronmental pollution injuries are not covered. 287 A third ambiguity 
concerns the effect of the redrafted language on the reasonable 
expectations of insureds. 288 These ambiguities are apparent when 
one applies the new pollution exclusion clause to the fact patterns of 
cases that focused on the initial subject matter phrase of the 1973 
policy's pollution exclusion clause. 289 
Non-industrial pollution may not be an "irritant or contaminant" 
as defined by the new pollution exclusion clause and therefore inju-
ries related to these emissions may continue to be covered as be-
fore. 29o The definition of "pollutant" in the redrafted clause appears 
designed to eliminate the ejusdem generis291 rationale behind the 
Molton, Allen and Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Insurance Co. holding, which found coverage when non-industrial 
pollution led to environmental injuries. 292 In Molton, sand runoff 
from a land development covered adjacent properties and polluted 
three lakes. 293 While the run-off injured the environment, the Molton 
court concluded that the runoff was not industrial pollution of the 
sort described by the pollution exclusion clause. 294 The Molton court 
viewed the 1973 pollution exclusion clause's specific mentioning of 
"smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, [and] toxic chemicals" as 
limiting the general terms "irritants, contaminants or pollutants" to 
industrial pollution because specific items suggestive of industrial 
2!l5 See infra notes 290-329 and accompanying text. 
2!l6 See infra notes 290-306 and accompanying text. 
287 See infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text. 
288 See infra notes 318-25 and accompanying text. 
289 While the various cases decided on the basis of the "sudden and accidental" exception to 
the old pollution exclusion would probably be litigated differently had the new language been 
used in those cases, for purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the revised language 
would block recovery for insureds. 
290 See supra notes 117-23 for a discussion of this limitation on the subject matter of the old 
pollution exclusion clause. 
291 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text. 
292 347 So. 2d 95, 98-99 (Ala. 1977). 
2'3:1 [d. at 96-97. 
294 See id. at 99. 
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by-products preceded the general terms. 295 In the 1985 pollution 
exclusion clause, the definition of "pollutant" is "any solid, liquid, 
gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, 
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste."296 The general 
terms "any ... irritant or contaminant" precede, rather than follow, 
the specifically identified items. Therefore, ejusdem generis is not 
applicable. The doctrine of ejusdem generis, however, is only a nar-
row example of a broader rule that specific words constrain the 
meaning of general terms when both types of terms are grouped 
together. 297 The 1985 pollution exclusion clause still mentions the 
same emissions as the 1973 clause, so the new wording may still be 
limited to industrial pollution. 298 
Insurers may continue to be bound to defend an insured when the 
insured caused injury by some means other than "actual, alleged or 
threatened" discharge. 299 Some courts held under the 1973 Compre-
hensive policy that insureds were covered because they were not 
"actual polluters. "300 The redrafted pollution exclusion clause seems 
directed at these cases. It only requires that a contamination injury 
"aris[e] out of actual, alleged or threatened discharge ... of pollu-
tants" for the clause to bar coverage. 301 However, under the 1985 
policy's language, courts may decide to restrict uninsurable injuries 
to those directly associated with contamination, as courts have so 
interpreted the 1973 policy to mean. 302 Both policies attempt to 
exclude coverage for injuries that "arise" out of emissions, but courts 
have allowed for coverage under the 1973 policy when the third-
party plaintiffs claim their injuries are the indirect result of contam-
ination. 303 Courts may continue to limit coverage in a similar manner 
29" See id. at 98-99. 
296 Commercial Coverage Form, supm note 36, at 2. 
297 2 COUCH, supm note 5, § 15.7l. 
298 See supm note 267 and accompanying text (new clause text); cf. s'upra note 58 and 
accompanying text (old clause text). 
299 Commercial Coverage Form, supra note 36, at 2; see text accompanying note 228. 
300 See Autotronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401, 403, 456 N. Y.S.2d 
504, 505 (App. Div. 1980); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415, 418, 439 
N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (App. Div.), mot. for Iv. to app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608, 427 N.E.2d 1191, 
443 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1981); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 
708, 714, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983). 
"01 For the text of the new pollution exclusion clause, see supra note 267 and accompanying 
text. 
302 See, e.g., Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Homp Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1019, 134 Cal. 
Rptr. 904, 908 (1977) (Comprehensive policy covers blast damage because such damage is 
distinguishable from oil contamillation injurie~). 
303 E.g., Clement v. Taylor, 382 So. 2d 2::'1, 234 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (injuries due to explosion 
caused by gas leak insurable). 
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under the 1985 policy. For example, under the 1985 policy language, 
a court may hold that injuries due to the negligent construction of a 
gas station304 or the failure to warn a land purchaser of latent toxins 
in the property305 arise most directly out of building or miscommun-
ication and not out of "actual, alleged or threatened" emissions. The 
new pollution exclusion clause may not eliminate coverage for these 
injuries because they are not caused by the insured's discharge of a 
contaminant or irritant. 306 
Decisions finding coverage under the 1973 Comprehensive policy 
for non-environmental contamination307-contamination that does 
not enter the land, water or atmosphere-may be more difficult to 
sustain under the 1985 pollution exclusion clause than decisions find-
ing coverage for non-industrial pollution because the new language 
omits direct references to discharges into the land, water or air. 308 
A court would have to imply a requirement of entry into the envi-
ronment from the phrase "discharge, dispersal, release or escape of 
pollutants."309 The term "pollutant" may have connotations of pol-
lution. 310 The term is not set in special print to indicate that it is 
being used in an unusual manner,3ll so there is an opportunity for 
judicial construction of "pollutant" according to its ordinary usage. 312 
The term is defined in the new pollution exclusion clause immediately 
after its use, so a court may find it is clear from the context that the 
term is being used as defined. 313 If a court does not imply a require-
ment of emission into the environment, then "escape" may be limited 
304 Autotronic, 89 A.D.2d at 404, 456 N. Y.S.2d at 506. 
305 Niagara, 80 A.D.2d at 420,439 N.Y.S.2d at 541-42. 
306 The use of the phrase "actual polluter" in cases under the 1973 Comprehensive policy's 
pollution exclusion cases implies an intentional output of an industrial process. E.g., Molton, 
347 So. 2d at 99; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 506. The definition of pollutant in the 1985 
policy may still imply an industrial operation. See infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text. 
Interpreting the 1985 clause as a whole would still suggest that the clause only applies to 
industrial emissions. 
307 See supra notes 124--30 and accompanying text. 
308 For a comparison of the new pollution exclusion clause language with the old, compare 
supra note 267 and accompanying text (new), with supra note 58 and accompanying text (old). 
309 Cf. C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (under old clause, complaint must allege discharge into environment for clause to 
apply); Connor v. Farmer, 382 So. 2d 1069, 1069-70 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 
267 (La. 1980) (under old clause, worker's silicosis not excluded because "injury ... arise[s] 
not from the discharge of sandblasting matter into the atmosphere" (emphasis original)). 
310 WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 219, at 1756 (pollutant is "something that pollutes"). 
311 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
312 See generally supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of various 
principles of insurance contract interpretation. 
313 See 2 COUCH, supra note 5, § 15.29. 
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to escape from a container or enclosure. 314 For example, in C .H. 
Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., the insurer 
had to defend C.H. Heist when toxic fumes contained in a tank 
injured a worker while he was cleaning the tank. 315 Because the 
injured worker did not allege that the fumes escaped the tank, the 
old pollution exclusion clause did not eliminate coverage. 316 Under 
the new pollution exclusion clause, workplace contamination may 
still be covered because there would be no escape from the premises 
or from a container. 317 
The redrafting of the pollution exclusion clause may limit the 
reasonable expectations of consumers as to their coverage, but like 
the decisions concerning non-industrial pollution318 and non-environ-
mental contamination,319 some injuries may still be reasonably ex-
pected to be covered despite the new language. 32o Much of the po-
tential confusion may concern what a reasonably prudent purchaser 
of insurance in the position of the insured would expect to be con-
sidered an irritant or contaminant. The nature of the business buying 
the insurance and the property being insured will still affect expec-
tations. 321 Reviewing a Comprehensive policy, the A -1 Sandblasting 
and Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden322 court expressed the view that 
a product that was in common use and that was not usually consid-
ered a contaminant was not one for purposes of the old pollution 
exclusion clause when a business used the product normally.323 The 
description of pollutant in the new pollution exclusion clause is not 
so different that it would prevent a similar construction by a court. 324 
314 See WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 219, at 774 (escape means "to issue from confinement 
or an enclosure esp[eciallyJ by way of a break"). 
315 640 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1981). 
316Id. 
317 See Connor v. Farmer, 382 So. 2d 1069, 1069-70 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 
267 (La. 1980) (worker developing silicosis from on site sandblasting covered because injuries 
not due to discharge into environment; injuries caused by lack of protective equipment). 
318 See supra notes 290--306 and accompanying text. 
319 See supra notes 307-17 and accompanying text. 
320 See supra notes 131--35 and accompanying text. 
321 See R. KEETON, supra note 24, § 6.3(a); cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 
486,489,426 N. Y.S.2d 603,605 (App. Div. 1980) (under Comprehensive policy, insurer covered 
tank leak when policy expressly insures tanks); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Van's Westlake Union, 
Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 714, 664 P.2d 1262, 1266, review denied, 100 Wash. 2d 1018 (1983) 
(under Comprehensive policy, gas station insured for leak because it was not an active 
polluter). 
322 53 Or. App. 890, 632 P.2d 1377 (1981), afl'd, 293 Or. 17,643 P.2d 1260 (1982). 
323 53 Or. App. at 894, 632 P.2d at 1379. The specific product in this instance was paint. 
324 Compare Commercial Coverage Form, supra note 36, at 2 (exclusion f) ("Pollutants 
means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, 
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If the purpose for purchasing an insurance policy was to cover a 
particular piece of property for a particular risk, a court may be 
reluctant to permit an insurer to evade the duties to defend and 
indemnify by use of the redrafted pollution exclusion clause. 325 
The redrafted pollution exclusion clause may not have eliminated 
all of the ambiguities that were in the pollution exclusion clause of 
the 1973 Comprehensive policy.326 The new policy has eliminated the 
ambiguous "sudden and accidental" exception, but further ambigui-
ties remain. The definition of pollutant327 in the new pollution exclu-
sion clause may still imply that only injuries from industrial envi-
ronmental pollution whose coverage cannot reasonably be expected 
are not in fact covered. 328 Coverage may continue as before for other 
types of contamination-related injuries. 329 
VII. REAPPRAISING THE IMPACT OF COVERAGE DECISIONS ON 
INCENTIVES TO ABATE POLLUTION 
Interpretations of coverage under the Comprehensive and the 
Commercial policies affect the economic incentives to abate or limit 
pollution. 330 Implicit in some of the holdings of the few cases that 
interpreted the 1973 pollution exclusion clause to limit coverage is 
the view that denying coverage helps achieve society's goal of a 
cleaner environment. 331 Most commentators analyzing the pollution 
exclusion clause of the 1973 Comprehensive policy share this view. 332 
Even many of the decisions that found the insured covered acknowl-
edge that coverage sometimes may hurt efforts to eliminate pollu-
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste") with 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 1. 72 (Com-
prehensive policy, including its pollution exclusion clause) (" ... smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, 
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants 
or pollutants ... "). 
"25 See 1 COUCH, supra note 5, § 5.2. 
326 See supra notes 290-325 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
328 See supra notes 290-325 and accompanying text. 
"29 See supra notes 117-35 and accompanying text. 
:<'0 See infra notes 331-57 and accompanying text. 
:>ll See American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. 
Mich. 1984) (court finds its holding reinforced by the policy behind the pollution exclusion 
clause, which is the prevention of industries seeking insurance instead of stopping pollution); 
Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co .. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1986) 
(insureds who can pass on liability will be lax in guarding against pollution). 
332 See, e.g., Adler & Broiles, supra note 11, at 1251; Tyler & Wilcox, supra note 9, at 520; 
Note, supra note 11, at 1239-40. 
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tion. 333 Yet most courts limit the effectiveness of the 1973 pollution 
exclusion clause334 and may do the same to the redrafted clause in 
the Commercial policy.335 Decisions that grant coverage for contam-
ination injuries do not necessarily conflict with society's goal of lim-
iting pollution. It may often be the case that granting coverage will 
provide both the insurer and the insured a greater economic incen-
tive to limit pollution than will denying coverage. To the extent that 
an insurer sets insurance premiums to reflect a business firm's dis-
posal practices, the premiums will help internalize the costs of im-
proper waste disposal on a firm-by-firm basis. 336 
One commonly expressed belief is that by denying coverage courts 
and insurers force polluters to bear the full cost of pollution. 337 These 
authorities fear that finding coverage would permit a polluting com-
pany to continue operations without a strong financial incentive to 
abate its pollution. 338 The cost to the polluter would be limited to its 
premium payments if the contamination injuries were covered. 339 
However, when a company is faced with insolvency because of a 
pollution-related liability, denying coverage may be too powerful a 
device to serve as an incentive to curtail pollution. If a polluter 
lacked sufficient assets to pay for the cost of pollution injuries, then 
the polluting company would only bear the cost of pollution to the 
extent of its assets. 340 Any costs beyond a company's assets would 
333 Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 415,418,439 N.Y.S.2d 538,540 (App. 
Div.), mot. for Iv. to app. dism., 54 N.Y.2d 608, 427 N.E.2d 1191,443 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1981); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486,487-88,426 N.Y.S.2d 603,604 (App. Div. 
1980). 
334 See supra notes 102-73 and accompanying text. 
&% See supra notes 259-329 and accompanying text for potential interpretive issues con-
cerning the 1985 Commercial policy. 
336 See Comment, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims: RCRA Insurance Regulat-ions 
and a Not So "Super'fund Act, 11 ENVTL. L. 689, 710 (1981); Note, Allocating the Costs of 
Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 584, 597-98 & n.63 (1981). 
337 E.g., Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 31, at 379. Hurwitz and Kohane quote Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller of New York when he approved legislation mandating the pollution exclu-
sion clause in New York insurance contracts. See 1971 N.Y. Laws 765 (originally codified at 
N.Y. INS. LAW § 46(13)-(14)). The Governor said that the statute would "prohibit commercial 
and industrial enterprises from purchasing insurance to protect themselves against liabilities 
arising out of their pollution of the environment where such prohibition is an appropriate 
measure of environmental protection." Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 31, at 379. The 1971 
provision mandating the pollution exclusion was repealed in 1982. 1982 N. Y. Laws 856. 
'J38 See Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 767. 
339 See generally Kunzman, supra note 34, at 478. 
340 Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The 
Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 602 (1983) 
("A corporation will be indifferent between enormous liability and lesser liability if both would 
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have no economic impact on a polluter's decisionmaking, since the 
company would never have to pay for these costS. 341 One commen-
tator has characterized this phenomena as the "deterrence trap. "342 
The deterrence trap frequently permits active businesses to avoid 
considering the effects of their pollution because the size of pollution 
liabilities often exceeds their assets. 343 Furthermore, polluting com-
panies are often out of business before the contamination injuries 
they have caused become apparent.344 The public or the injured 
parties will bear the costs of pollution that exceed polluters' assets.345 
The full costs of pollution will not be borne by polluters in these 
situations. 346 
bankrupt it" (emphasis original)). One commentator described the availability of bankruptcy 
in environmental liability cases as "[t]he ultimate in self-insurance." Developments in the Law, 
supra note 3, at 1585. In bankruptcy, a firm finances its liabilities arising out of environmental 
injuries by imposing upon injured parties the excess of the costs of these injuries over the 
assets of the bankrupt firm. See id. at 1574. 
341 Amicus Curiae Brief of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellee at 5-6, Shapiro v. Public Servo Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 648, 477 N.E.2d 
146 (No. 83-1366), review denied, 395 Mass. 1102, 480 N.E.2d 24 (1985) [hereinafter Shapiro 
Amicus Brief]; cf. Note, supra note 340, at 601 (a firm that anticipates it will be defunct when 
the harm occurs may discount the amount necessary to compensate parties for its environ-
mental liability by the probability that it will escape liability altogether). 
342 Note, supra note 340, at 601-02. 
343Id. In the area of hazardous waste, one 1979 study for the Environmental Protection 
Agency determined that 64% of hazardous waste sites were privately owned but financially 
non-viable. FRED C. HART ASSOCIATES, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR 
NATIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEMS (EPA Contract No. 68-01-5063, 1979), cited in 
Fisher, The Toxic Waste Dump Problem and a Suggested Insurance Program, 8 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 421, 427 (1980); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1574 n.2 
(in recent years in New Jersey, there have been 10 major cases per year involving bankruptcy 
filings by firms seeking to avoid environmental liabilities). Regulations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6924(6) of RCRA affect insurance requirements for new and ongoing waste sites. 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 264.147, 265.147 (1986) (redesignated 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.148,265.148 by 51 Fed. Reg. 37,854 
(1986». 
For a discussion of the impact of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. III 1985) and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9657 (1982) as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (l00 Stat.) 1613, on 
coverage under the Comprehensive policy, see supra notes 2, 65, 204-12, 226, 270 and 
accompanying text. 
In areas other than hazardous waste, the business that polluted may not be capable of 
compensating victims. See Shapiro Amicus Brief, supra note 341, at 6 n.5. 
:<44 Shapiro Amicus Brief, supra note 341, at 5 & nA; see, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. V. 
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., Sl1 F.2d l1S0, 1183, l1S4 n.S (8th Cir. 1987) 
(Northeastern Pharmaceutical defunct in 1974, initial contamination discovered in 19S0). 
345 Shapiro Amicus Brief, supra note 341, at 5 & nA. 
346 Cf. Note, supra note 336, at 597 (full internalization of cleanup and compensation costs 
impossible if responsible parties are effectively insulated from liability); Note, supra note ;:)40, 
at 601-02 (discussing various ways firms underestimate the costs of pollution). 
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By interpreting pollution exclusion clauses as permitting coverage 
for contamination injuries, the cost of these injuries would be re-
flected in premium charges. 347 In effect, when the insured pays 
premiums in proportion to the risk of covered injury, the insured 
already is paying for the full cost of pollution. 348 Insurers pass on 
the costs of coverage to each company in proportion to the magnitude 
and probability of the harm each company may cause.349 Due to the 
fact that from 1975 onward most decisions interpreting the Compre-
347 See Comment, supra note 336, at 710; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1578. 
Kunzman discusses some of the difficulties in setting premiums for pollution coverage. Prin-
ciple difficulties in setting premiums that properly internalize the costs of waste disposal 
include: 1) the lack of insurer experience with pollution claims; 2) the impact of changing 
technologies on the waste disposal industry, as well as on waste generation and transportation; 
3) the diversion of insurers' resources into "regulatory" functions, such as research into the 
effectiveness of abatement processes, and away from the low cost delivery of risk-spreading. 
See generally Kunzman, supra note 34, at 481-87. Despite the difficulties in setting proper 
premiums, Kunzman recognizes that insurers still have a role in evaluating the risks of 
pollution associated with industrial processes and in the provision of indemnity for pollution-
related injuries. Id. at 487-88. 
348 Clearly, this is not to say that when pollution damage becomes so certain that it may be 
seen as an operating cost of the business, it is an insurable risk. Cf. R. KEETON, supra note 
24, § 5.3(a). Rather, this is merely a recognition of the fact that underwriters balance the 
likelihood of a loss and its possible magnitude in such a way that in the aggregate premiums 
pay for the costs to the insurers. 
349 A hypothetical example will illustrate how construing a general liability insurance policy 
to allow for coverage of some pollution injuries would promote the public's goal of deterring 
pollution. Consider a company that has net assets of $3,000,000 and an annual income of 
$600,000. This company has a likelihood of having a contamination-related occurrence once in 
forty years. If the company takes no precautions to minimize the severity of the occurrence, 
the cost of the related injuries will be $10,000,000. Its expected income would be the probability 
of earning its annual income less the probability of losing all its assets as a result of an 
occurrence. This would be $510,000, or ($600,000 x 39/40l-{$3,000,000 x 1140). 
Assume that the company could spend $400,000 and lower the gravity of the potential injury 
from $10,000,000 to $3,000,000. If the company could not obtain insurance under the so-called 
"polluter pays" public policy principle, the company would not spend the $400,000 to reduce 
the gravity of the potential injury. The company would not take the precautions because the 
company would go bankrupt in the event of an occurrence whether or not it spent the $400,000. 
Even though one occurrence causes more than three times as grave an injury as the other, 
both would have the same impact on the company's finances. If the company could obtain 
insurance, it would be more likely to spend the $400,000 than if it could not obtain insurance. 
The insurance premium would be based on the gravity and the likelihood of loss plus some 
profit for the insurer. If the company spent the $400,000, the premium would be approximately 
$75,000, or ($3,000,000 x 1140). Spreading the cost of the $400,000 improvement over its 
estimated useful life would impose an annualized cost of $10,000, or ($400,000 x 1140). Because 
the company would not be exposed to bankruptcy, the company's estimated income would be 
$515,000 per year less the insurer's profit, or «$600,000 x 40/40)-$75,000-$10,000). Assuming 
the company's managers would like to stay in business in order to preserve their jobs, and 
also assuming that management prefers a more reliable income stream to a more risky one, 
then management would want to make the $400,000 expenditure and obtam insurance even if 
the insurer's profit somewhat lessens the company's expected profits. 
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hensive policy had found coverage for the insured, premiums after 
1975 for that policy may have reflected a belief that insurers would 
be bound to defend and indemnify insureds. 350 To deny coverage 
when the insurer set premiums expecting to cover certain pollution 
injuries would provide insurers with a windfall. 
An additional advantage in making the insurance company pay for 
the costs of pollution is to utilize the insurance industry's expertise 
in loss prevention to minimize the possibilities of environmental 
damage. 351 Insurers have facilities that evaluate risks and suggest 
ways businesses may operate with less potential for harm. 352 If the 
insurance industry is allowed to avoid easily any liability for pollution 
damage, there would be no incentive for the industry to use its 
resources in the fight against pollution. 353 Allowing coverage will 
make it likely that insurers will inspect policyholders354 and insist 
upon precautions to prevent contamination damage prior to the is-
suance or renewal of a policy.355 Such insurer vigilance would both 
help prevent contamination through detection and elimination of 
pollution risks and also aid insurance companies in establishing that 
an event was expected and not covered. 356 Thus, an insurer could 
minimize the costs of pollution and the costs of insurance by moni-
toring insureds.357 Because holding that general liability policies 
cover pollution-related injuries would bring the skills of the insur-
ance industry to bear upon pollution prevention, a broad interpre-
350 It is possible that American States assumed that under the normal construction of the 
pollution exclusion it had a duty to defend National Drum. It may have settled cases quickly 
for small amounts believing that all the insurers had a duty to defend and would make it up 
in costs. See American States, 587 F. Supp. at 1550-51; see alsf! Last, supra note 3, at 10,254 
("More and more insurers are now defending Superfund claims under [Comprehensive] poli-
cies."). 
Another indication that the insurance industry recognized that the Comprehensive policy 
covered many emission injuries is the effort to redraft the pollution exclusion clause in the 
Commercial policy. 
351 Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 772. 
352 /d.; see Sparrow, supra note 3, at 173; Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1579 
n.40. 
353 See Soderstrom, supra note 39, at 772. 
354 Shapiro Amicus brief, supra note 341, at 3 & n.2; see Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 
338 Pa. Super. 1, 14,487 A.2d 820,827 (1984). Reliance identified the risk of trichloroethylene 
exposure more than a year prior to the third party suit. 
355 See Comment, supra note 336, at 710-11 (waste disposal facilities that use improper 
disposal methods will not be able to obtain insurance and therefore may not be able to meet 
regulatory requirements for financial responsibility). 
356 See Techalloy, 338 Pa. Super. at 14, 487 A.2d at 827; Comment, supra note 336, at 711; 
see also supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text. 
357 See Kunzman, supra note 34, at 486. 
652 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:601 
tation of coverage may help curtail pollution more efficiently than a 
narrow interpretation of coverage. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Courts that have limited the ability of the Comprehensive policy's 
pollution exclusion clause to bar coverage for pollution-related inju-
ries have interpreted the entire insurance policy consistently with 
general principles of insurance contract law. Ambiguity in both the 
clause's "subject matter" phrase, which described the scope of po-
tentially excludable contamination, and the clause's "sudden and 
accidental" exception, which limited the types of potentially unin-
surable discharges, demanded that courts treat many pollution-re-
lated injuries as insurable. A systematic approach to interpreting 
the Comprehensive policy-one that first determines whether an 
injury was an "occurrence" and then analyzes the entire pollution 
exclusion clause-would illustrate to a court the ambiguities in the 
clause. Due to potential ambiguities in the new clause's scope lan-
guage, the 1985 Commercial policy's pollution exclusion clause may 
still be ambiguous despite removal of the Comprehensive policy's 
"sudden and accidental" exception. 
While many commentators and courts suggest that denying cov-
erage under general business liability insurance policies for pollution-
related injuries would provide the greatest incentiv~ to limit pol-
lution, in many instances finding coverage would lead to adequate 
victim compensation, conservation of government funds, and less 
pollution. The most effective way to involve insurers in efforts to 
limit pollution under both the Comprehensive policy and the Com-
mercial policy would be to interpret the pollution exclusion clause 
narrowly. When courts consistently interpret the clauses narrowly, 
they enable insurers to set policy premiums at levels that force all 
companies to internalize accurately the costs of their pollution. 
